Blocked Pathways: Potential Legal Responses to Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals by Sachs, Noah M.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications School of Law
1999
Blocked Pathways: Potential Legal Responses to
Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals
Noah M. Sachs
University of Richmond, nsachs@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Noah Sachs, Blocked Pathways: Potential Legal Responses to Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals, 24 Colum. J. OF Envtl. L. 289 (1999)
Blocked Pathways: 
Potential Legal Responses to 
Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals 
Noah Sachs* 
I. Introduction .......................................................... 290 
II. OveiView of Endocrine Disruption ......................... 292 
A. The Endocrine System ..................................... 292 
B. Animal Studies on Endocrine Disruption ......... 293 
C. Health Effects of Endocrine Disruption in 
Humans .......................................................... 295 
D. DES as a Scientific Parallel for EDCs ............... 298 
E. Implications of the Scientific Research ............ 300 
III. Types of Suspected EDCs ...................................... 302 
IV. Potential Regulation of EDCs ................................ 307 
A. Current Endocrine Disruption Programs ......... 307 
B. Current Statutory Authority to Regulate EDCs 310 
C. Inadequacies of the Current Regulatory Re-
gime ................................................................ 316 
1. Risk Assessment ......................................... 316 
2. Bureaucratic and Judicial Obstacles .......... 321 
V. Potential Litigation over Endocrine Disrupting 
Chemicals ............................................................. 326 
A. Obstacles to Successful Litigation over EDCs .. 326 
B. Parallels with DES Litigation ........................... 333 
C. Other Legal Parallels for EDC Litigation ........... 338 
D. Drawbacks of Litigation for Addressing EDC 
Risks ............................................................... 341 
VI. Proposals for Reform ............................................. 344 
A. Prospects for Congressional Action .................. 345 
B. Right-to-Know Provisions ................................ 346 
• Stanford Law School, Class of 1999. The author wishes to thank Professors Bob 
Rabin and Jim Salzman of Stanford Law School for their comments on this article. 
as well as the editors at the Columbia Journal of Environmental Law for their 
valuable assistance. 
289 
290 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 24:289 
C. Burden-Shifting under TSCA ........................... 348 
VII. Conclusion ............................................................ 351 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent scientific research indicates that synthetic chemi-
cals may disrupt the human endocrine system, possibly 
causing decreased fertility, malformed reproductive organs, 
increased levels of cancer in reproductive organs, impaired 
fetal development, and neurological, thyroid, and immune 
disorders. 1 These endocrine disrupting chemicals (EDCs), 
which mimic, block, or otherwise interfere with normal 
hormonal signals, are found in pesticides, plastics, deter-
gents, industrial materials, drinking water, and other sub-
stances. 2 Over fifty different chemicals may have endocrine 
disrupting effects,3 and these chemicals permeate our envi-
ronment. We may be exposed to them through the prod-:-
ucts we use, the food we eat, the water we drink, and the 
air we breath. 
Inquily into endocrine disruption is relatively re<;:ent, and 
scientists still do not have a full understanding of the 
mechanisms through which EDCs may harm human 
health. Some of the suspected links between EDCs and 
health and reproductive disorders may turn out to be false, 
but if the central hypothesis is confirmed that synthetic 
chemicals are disrupting hormonal pathways, EDCs could 
be among the most persistent, widespread, and damaging 
toxins to which humans have been exposed. Reflecting on 
the potential danger and current scientific uncertainties, 
the authors of Our Stolen Future, 4 a 1996 book on endocrine 
1. See Robert J. Kavlock et al., Research Needs for the Risk Assessment of 
Health and Environmental Effects of Endocrtne Disruptors: A Report of the U.S. EPA-
sponsored Workshop, 104 ENVIL. HEAL1H PERSPEC'IlVES. Supplement 4, 715, 720 
(1996). 
2. See Jonna Topparl et al., Male Reproductive Health and Environmental Xeno-
estrogens, 104 ENVIL. HEAL1H PERSPEC'IlVES, Supplement 4, 741. 758 (1996). 
3. See 'niEO COLBORN ET AL., OUR SroLEN FtrruRE: ARE WE 'I'HREAmNING OUR 
FEimUIY. INreWGENCE AND SURVIVAL?- A SCIENilFIC DETEC11VE SroRY 81 (1996). 
For a list of suspected endocrine dlsruptors. see Known Enodcrine Disruptors 
Oast modified May 6, 1996) <:www.vcu.edu/cesweb/ed/disruptors.html>. Some of 
the suspected endocrine disruptors, such as DDT and PCBs, are no longer pro-
duced in the United States, but they persist in the environment and are believed 
to be significant contributors to EDC risks. See Part III, infra. 
4. OUR SroLEN Fl.JruRE was aimed at a lay audience and contained a foreword by 
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disruption, warn that "humans do appear to be gambling 
with their ability to reproduce over the long term .... "5 
Although there is a clear need for further research into 
EDCs, the legal and regulatory communities should begin 
to consider the types of responses that may be appropriate 
if the scientific evidence grows stronger. Very little legal lit-
erature has been produced on EDCs, however, and most 
academic and governmental discussion of EDCs has fo-
cused on understanding their health risks and on identify-
ing new avenues for research. As Mary O'Brian, a toxics 
and risk assessment specialist, notes, those "trained in 
law ... must supply ideas for litigation and legislation that 
are equal to the problem. "6 
This article describes and assesses potential legal re-
sponses to EDCs, focusing on regulation and litigation, and 
concludes that existing legal tools will probably be inade-
quate to respond to EDC risks. The main obstacle to legal 
action is scientific uncertainty, which has frequently posed 
challenges for our legal system in contexts such as envi-
ronmental regulation and toxic tort litigation. Scientific 
uncertainty is likely to plague the risk assessment process 
for EDCs, delaying potentially effective regulations even 
though existing statutes provide sufficient authority to 
regulate EDCs. 7 In the litigation context, scientific uncer-
tainty will make it difficult to connect a given EDC to a 
given harm. 8 The usual problems with bringing a toxic tort 
suit, such as long latency periods, proof of causation, and 
identification of defendants, would be magnified many-fold. 
Although scientific understanding of EDCs is likely to in-
crease over the next few years, remaining uncertainties can 
probably be used as a shield to block regulatory efforts and 
Vice President Al Gore, who compared the book to Rachel Carson's Silent Spring. 
Id. at vii. For examples of media reports about the book and endocrine disruption 
generally, see Michael Lemonick, What's Wrong with Our Spemf? TIME, March 18, 
1996, at 78; Sharon Begley, 1lle Great Impostors, NEWSWEEK. March 18, 1996, at 
48; John Carey, A Scary Wamtng- or Scare Story? BUSINESS WEEK, April 8, 1996, 
at 18; Rick Weiss & Gary Lee, PoUution's Effect on Hwnan Homwnes: When Fear 
Exceeds Evidence, WASH. Posr, March 31, 1996, atA14. 
5. COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 234. 
6. Mary O'Brian, Our Current Taxies Use Ftamework. Our Stolen Future, and Our 
Options, 11 J. ENvn.. L. & Lrr. 331, 332 (1996). 
7. See infra Part IV. 
8. See infra Part V. 
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claims by tort litigants. In short, we may be facing a sig-
niflcant new toxic risk with few legal tools available to pro-
tect public health. 
This article acknowledges the preliminary nature of sci-
entific investigation of EDCs. It undertakes an examination 
of potential legal responses not to urge immediate legal ac-
tion, but to explore options so that the scientific and legal 
communities can begin to share ideas as research pro-
gresses. Because EDCs have unusual toxicological char-
acteristics, current risk assessment techniques and regu-
latory tools may be inadequate. Fundamentally new 
approaches may need to be developed if the United States is 
to respond effectively to EDC risks. In the near term, a 
consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of existing 
legal and regulatory options can help to identify more effec-
tive approaches to EDCs. 
Part II of this article provides an overview of EDCs and 
the current state of scientific knowledge regarding their 
health effects. The main categories and uses of EDCs are 
outlined in Part III. Part IV explores the adequacy of cur-
rent toxic chemical statutes and regulations for addressing 
EDC risks, and Part V examines the prospects for litigation 
over EDCs. Finally, Part VI briefly outlines some promising 
new approaches to EDCs that could be warranted if the sci-
entific case against EDCs contlriues to strengthen. 
II. OVERVIEW OF ENDOCRINE DISRUPTION 
A. The Endocrine System 
The endocrine system, along with the nervous system and 
the immune system, is one of the three main integrating 
and regulatory mechanisms in the human body.9 The en-
docrine system is composed of hormone-secreting glands 
such as the pituitary, hypothalamus, testicles, or ovaries; 
over 50 different chemical hormones that travel through the 
bloodstream, such as estrogen or testosterone; and hor-
9. See RisK AssESSMENT FORUM TEcHNICAL PANEL. UNITED STATES ENviRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA/630/R-96/012, SPECIAL REPORT ON ENDOCRINE 
DISRUPnON: AN EFFECI'S AssESSMENT AND ANALYSIS 2 (1997) [hereinafter EPA RISK 
AssESSMENT FORUM). <WWW.epa.gov/ORD/WebPubs/endocrine/endocrine.pdf>. 
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mone receptors located throughout the body. 10 Hormones 
regulate many key bodily functions, including blood sugar, 
ovulation, pregnancy, and development. 11 They act by 
binding with protein receptors in locations such as the 
brain, glands, or reproductive organs to change cell activity, 
including the activation of strands of DNA to express 
genes. 12 Hormones can act in extremely low doses, as low 
as parts-per-trillion concentrations in the blood stream.13 
Endocrine disrupting chemicals can interfere with normal 
hormonal functioning in several ways. They can disrupt 
the synthesis, storage, release, transport, and clearance of 
hormones, and they can disturb receptor recognition, re-
ceptor binding, or post-receptor responses within cells. 14 
Some EDCs are hormone mimickers that bind to protein re-
ceptors in place of the natural hormone. Some enhance (an 
agonistic effect) or inhibit (an antagonistic effect) the action 
of hormones. 15 Other EDCs may directly affect the overall 
production of certain hormones in the body. 16 Much of the 
scientific research into EDCs has focused on estrogenic 
compounds: chemicals that mimic estrogen. 17 
B. Animal Studies on Endocrine Disruption 
Several animal studies have linked exposure to EDCs to 
reproductive and developmental problems, as well as to 
cancer. 18 While inferring human health risks from animal 
studies has often been controversial, the EPA has noted 
that the hypothesis that humans are being harmed by 
EDCs "is supported by obsetvations of similar effects in 
aquatic and wildlife species. In other words, a common 
10. See ENDoCRINE DISRUPI'OR SCREENING AND TEsnNG ADVISORY COMM., UNITED 
SrA"IES ENVIRONMENTAL PROIECI10N AGENCY, FINAL REPORT 2-1 (1998) Oast modified 
Jan. 19, 1999) <http:/ /www.epa.gov/opptlntr/opptendo> [hereinafter EDSTAC 
,REPORT). 
11. See fd. 
12. See fd. at 2-2 (explaining that as many as 50 to 100 genes In a cell may be 
controlled by the binding of a single type of hormone to the receptors In the cell). 
13. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 74. 
14. See EPA RISK AssESSMENT FORUM, supra note 9, at 14. See also Kavlock, su-
pra note 1, at 721. 
15. SeeEPARISKAssESSMENTFORUM, supra. note 9, at 13. 
16. See fd. at 14. · 
17. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 84-85. 
18. See generally fd., chapter 10 at 167. See also EPA RisK AssESSMENT FORUM, 
supra note 9, at 54-78. 
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theme runs through both human and wildlife reports. "19 
Alligators in Lake Apopka, Flortda, provide one of the 
most well-known examples of reproductive problems that 
may be linked to endocrine disruption. The alligators were 
exposed to a mixture of DDT, 20 DDE, 21 dicofol, chlorobenzi-
late, and dicholorobenzophenone from a 1980 chemical 
spill. 22 These suspected EDCs have among them both es-
trogenic and anti-androgenic (inale hormone blocking) 
properties. 23 Scientists found that the male alligators were 
demasculinized, with penises one half to one-fourth normal 
size.24 Male hatchlings were found to have a ratio of estra-
diol (a form of estrogen) to testosterone of four times the 
normal male ratio, 25 and female hatchlings were "super-
feminized," with an estradiol/testosterone ratio twice as 
high as normal. 26 There were severe hatching problems 
among the alligators: only 5% to 20% of the eggs in each 
examined nest hatched, compared to a normal hatching 
rate of 65% to 80%.27 
Rodent studies have also linked EDCs to developmental 
and reproductive disorders. 28 The EPA has concluded that 
"[c]onvincing evidence exists in rodents that exposure to 
chemicals that have estrogenic activity, reduce androgen 
levels, or otherwise interfere with the action of androgen 
during development can cause male reproductive system 
abnormalities that include reduced sperm production capa-
bility and reproductive tract abnormalities. "29 One rodent 
study involved administering vinclozolin, a fungicide, to 
pregnant rats. 30 Scientists found that male offspring had 
impaired penis development, existence of vaginal pouches, 
prostate gland problems, and reduced or absent sperm pro-
19. ld. at 5. 
20. Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane. 
21. Bis(4-chlorophenyl)-l,ldichloroethene. DDE is a DDT metabolite (break-
down product). 
22. See EPA RISK AssESSMENT FORUM, supra note 9, at 65-66 for discussion of 
the Lake Apopka studies. 
23. See Toppari et al .• supra note 2, at 756. 
24. See EPA RISK AssESSMENT FORUM, supra note 9, at 66. 
25. See id. 
26. ld. 
27. See id. 
28. See id. at 7-8. 
29. Id. at 3. 
30. See id. at 35. 
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duction - all characteristic of interference with the recep-
tors for male hormones. 31 
Scientists have conducted numerous other laboratocy and 
epidemiological studies on EDCs' effects on rodents, birds, 
fish, seals, and other animals. 32 The research is too abun-
dant to discuss in detail here. The EPA has summarized 
this animal research, however, by stating that "numerous 
reports indicate a variety of compounds can modulate the 
endocrine system and affect reproduction and development 
in invertebrates, fish, and wildlife . . . . "33 
C. Health Effects of Endocrine Disruption in Humans 
While the data from animal studies are suggestive, the 
impact of EDCs on human health and reproduction is of 
course the more important issue from a legal perspective. 
EDCs have been associated in scientl.flc literature with a 
wide variety of human health problems, including reduced 
fertility, birth defects, cancer, endometriosis (a disease of 
the uterus), malformed reproductive organs, glandular dis-
function, and neurological disorders. 34 The evidence on 
human health risks. from EDCs has been controversial, and 
the studies are not conclusive, but the research conducted 
to date offers disturbing warnings that EDCs may pose a 
hazard to human health. 
One of the most widely publicized human heal,th effects 
hypothesized to be caused by EDCs is a reduced sperm 
count. Some scientists believe that adult sperm counts 
may be lowered by exposure of male fetuses to synthetic 
estrogenic chemicals in the womb. 35 A 1992 article in the 
British Medical Journal reviewed sixty-one studies involving 
almost fifteen thousand men in over a dozen countries and 
concluded that sperm counts had dropped forty-five percent 
31. See id. 
32. See id. at 56-77. 
33. Id. at 8-9. 
34. See generally id. at 21-54. 
35. See id. at 36. See also Elisabeth Carlsen et al., Declining Semen Quality and 
Increasing Incidence of Testicular Cancer: Is 7here a Coll111lDn Cause?, 103 ENvrL. 
HEALni PERSPECnVES, Supplement 7, 137-138 (1995). (Discussing possible causal 
biological mechaniSill!J and concluding that "(t)he physiological basis for a possible 
role of estrogens in male reproductive dysfunction seems to be feasible," but that 
"(i)t should be remembered that the estrogen hypothesis remains to be tested. • Id. 
at 138.) 
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from 1938 to 1990.36 Older men (born in decades when 
there were fewer synthetic chemicals) appear to have higher 
sperm counts than younger men, "lend[ing) support to the 
concept that adverse prenatal factors may influence the 
sperm production capacity in adult life. "37 Other research-
ers have criticized the methodology of the sperm count 
studies or have found no decline in sperm counts in inde-
pendent tests,38 but the most recent U.S. study found that 
sperm counts in the United States have declined by an av-
erage rate of about 1.5o/o per year over the past five dec-
ades.39 
Some scientists believe endocrine disruption has contrib-
uted to increasing rates of cancer of the testicles and pros-
tate gland. 40 Both tissues are hormone-sensitive. The re-
ported incidence of testicular cancer in the United States 
increased 45.4o/o between 1973 and 1995,41 and testicular 
cancer is now the most common cancer among men ages 25 
to 34.42 The reported incidence of prostate cancer increased 
119.6o/o between 1973 and 1995.43 
Summarizing the data on male reproductive disorders, 
the Danish scientist Jorma Toppari concludes that "[a]ll of 
the best evidence available points with some certainty to a 
rising tide in Europe and many other countries of human 
male reproductive disorders involving sperm counts (and 
probably sperm quality), testicular cancer, malformation of 
36. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 172-173. See also Toppart et al., su-
pra note 2, at 742 (also discussing the original study). 
37. Toppari et al., supra note 2, at 743. 
38. See EPA RISK AssESSMENr FORUM, supra. note 9, at 36-37. See also, Stephen 
H. Safe, Envirorunental and Dietary Estrogens and Hwnan Health: Is There a Prob-
lemJ, 103 ENVIL. HEALTII PERSPECnVES 346, 347 (1995). (Noting that this hy-
pothesis was not based on experimental measurements of increased levels of es-
trogenic compounds in men and discussing reports that reevaluated data to 
dispute declines in sperm count). 
39. See Andrew Boswer. Decline in Spenn Density May be Even Worse Than Re-
ported, UROLOGY TIMES, February 1998, at 1 (discussing California Department of 
Health Services Study). 
40. See EPA RisK AssESSMENr FORUM, supra note 9, at 39, 42. 
41. See Ries et al., National Cancer Institute, SEER Cancer Statistics Review, 
1973-1995 Table XXIV-1 (1998) Oast modified January 21, 1999) 
<http:/ /www.seer.ims.nci.nih.gov/Publlcations/CSR7395>. 
42. See EPA RISK AssESSMENr FORUM, supra note 9, at 39. See also Toppart et 
al .. supra note 2, at 743. 
43. See Ries et al., supra note 41, at Table XXII-I. 
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the external genitalia, and possibly testicular mal descent. 0944 
Toppari asserts that "[a]ll of the described changes in male 
reproductive health appear interrelated and may have a 
common origin in fetal life or childhood, "45 but ultimately 
determines that "[t]here are insufficient data to prove or 
disprove that these adverse changes in male reproductive 
health are the result, wholly or partially, of exposure to en-
vironmental estrogens. "46 
The evidence of adverse health effects of EDCs in adult 
women has been controversial. Some scientists have linked 
PCBs and dioxin, both suspected EDCs, to endometriosis, 
but later studies appear to refute this hypothesis. 47 Other 
studies have linked chlorinated organic compounds such as 
DDT and PCBs, which exhibit weak estrogenicity, to an in-
creased risk of breast cancer, 46 but these studies have been 
criticized and other evidence is conflicting. 49 There is sci-
entific consensus, however, on the basic point that a 
"causal relationship [exists] between female breast cancer 
and hormonal activity" in general. 50 Reported cases of 
breast cancer increased 25.2o/o between 1973 and 1995,51 
and the most notable increase has been in post-
menopausal women with estrogen-responsive tumors, that 
is, tumors that grow when exposed to estrogen or estrogenic 
chemicals. 52 Numerous studies have found a link between 
rodent exposure to EDCs and disruption of the timing of 
menstrual cycles, the development of ovarian follicles, and 
the speed of embryo transport through fallopian tubes, all 
of which affect female rat fertility. 53 There is no data on 
whether human females are experiencing reduced fertility 
44. Topparl et al .• supra note 2, at 764. 
45. Id. at 768. 
46. Id. at 764. 
47. See EPA RISK AssESSMENT FORUM, supmnote 9, at 28-29. 
48. See Wolff, M.S .• Pesticides - How Research has Succeeded and FaUed in In-
forming Policy: DDT and the Link with Breast Cancer, 103 ENvr'L. HEALTii 
PERSPEC11VES, Supplement 6, 87-91 (1995) (discussing four recent small studies 
suggesting link between breast cancer and organochlorine levels in the body and 
noting that much further research is necessary). 
49. See EPA RISK AssESSMENT FORUM, supm note 9, at 30. See also Safe, supm 
note 38, at 346-347 (discussing studies that dispute the association). 
50. Kavlock et al., supm note 1, at 718. 
51. See Ries et al., supra note 41, at Table 11-1. 
52. See COlBORN ET AL., supm note 3, at 182-183. 
53. See EPA RISK AssESSMENT FORUM, supm note 9, at 22-25. 
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due to EDCs, however. A recent study found that girls are 
entering puberty at an increasingly early age and suggested 
that EDCs, . in mimicking natural hormones, may be a 
cause.54 
The greatest health risks from EDCs are probably not to 
adult males or females, but to human fetuses exposed in 
utero to EDCs taken into the mother's body. Fetuses are 
particularly vulnerable to EDCs because development and 
sexual differentiation depend on low-dose hormonal signals 
received at precise times during gestation. The formation of 
the testicles in the male fetus around the seventh week of 
gestation and their first release of testosterone are the key 
steps in male sexual differentiation, 55 as prior to that time 
fetuses have uilisex gonads.56 The EPA states that "[t]he 
development of the male reproductive system pre- and 
postnatally appears to be particularly susceptible [to hor-
mone disruption] and uniquely sensitive. "57 Problems in 
sexual differentiation, such as undescended testicles, in-
complete penis development, or the presence of rudimen-
taiy components of the female reproductive tract, could oc-
cur when the hormonal signals in genetic male fetuses are 
disturbed by exogenous chemicals. 56 
D. DES as a Scientific Parallel for EDCs 
The best data on the possible effects of EDCs on male and 
female fetuses come from the sons and daughters of women 
who took diethylstilbestrol (DES) during pregnancy. A 
synthetic estrogen that also has anti-androgenic proper-
ties, 59 DES was given to 4.8 million women in the United 
States from the late 1940's to the early 1970's to prevent 
54. See Marcia E. Hennan-Giddens et al., Secondary Sexual Characteristics and 
Menses in Young Girls Seen in O.ffice Practice: A Study from the Pediatric Research 
in O.ffice Setttngs Network, 99 PEDIATRICS 505 (1997) (study of 17.077 girls finding 
that 48.3% of African-American girls and 14.7% of white girls had begun breast 
and/or pubic hair development by age 8). This contrasts with earlier studies 
showing development at later ages. The authors urged investigation into whether 
the early onset of puberty is related to increasing use of plastics and pesticides 
that have estrogen-related physiological effects. Id. at 511. 
55. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 43-44. 
56. See id. at 42. 
57. EPA RrSKAssESSMENr FORUM, supra note 9, at 33. 
58. See id. at 33-34. 
59. See id. at 38. 
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miscarriages and other pregnancy complications. 60 The 
daughters of women who took DES exhibited increased 
rates of a rare form of vaginal cancer called clear-cell ade-
nocarcinoma, 61 and also showed increased rates of adenosis 
(abnormal vaginal or cervical growths), T-shaped uteri, 
damaged cervixes, miscarriages; and ectopic pregnancies. 62 
The DES daughters represent the strongest evidence to date 
that maternal exposures to synthetic estrogen-mimicking 
chemicals can lead to cancer and reproductive disorders in 
offspring. 
DES has also caused harmful effects in male offspring. 
1\vo controlled studies of DES-exposed sons showed in-
creased incidences of genital malformation, testicular dis-
orders, and smaller-than-average penises,63 all consistent 
with in utero exposure to an estrogenic chemical during de-
velopment of male sexual characteristics. Overall repro-
ductive tract abnormality in the DES sons was 32%, versus 
8% in controls, 54 and sperm count in the DES-exposed sons 
was 79% that of the non-exposed control group.65 Cryptor-
chidism (undescended testicles) has also been observed to 
occur more frequently in DES-exposed sons.66 
Starting in the mid-1970's, DES-exposed children began 
to file lawsuits against DES manufacturers seeking dam-
ages for cancer and reproductive abnormalities. Just as the 
DES experience has provided the scientific community with 
the best available data on the effects of endocrine disrupt-
ing chemicals on fetal development and reproductive abili-
ties of offspring, it also provides the legal community with 
the principal precedents for intergenerational lawsuits in-
volving endocrine disruption. The DES litigation is dis-
cussed in more detail below. 67 
60. See Toppart et al .• supra note 2, at 753. 
61. See Tracey I. Batt, Note, DES Third-Generation UabUity: A Proximate Cause, 
18 CARDozo L. REv. 1217, 1221 (1996). 
62. See id. 
63. See EPA RISK AssESSMENT FORUM, supra note 9, at 38. 
64. See id. 
65. See id. 
66. See Toppart et al., supra note 2, at 754. 
67. See infra Part V(B). 
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E. Implications of the Scientific Research 
Because scientific inquiry into endocrine disruption is 
relatively recent, it is not yet possible to demonstrate a 
causal link between a particular EDC and a given health or 
reproductive disorder. Numerous associational links have 
been established, however, and the rise in breast, prostate, 
and testicular cancer, as well the increasing rate of unde-
scended testicles and declining sperm counts, are cause for 
concern. The EPA explains that "[w]ith few exceptions (e.g., 
DES), a causal relationship between exposure to a specific 
environmental agent and an adverse effect on human 
health operating via an endocrine disruption mechanism 
has not been established . ..sa Even Our Stolen Future ac-
knowledges that "[i]t will never be possible to establish a 
definitive cause-and-effect connection with [endocrine dis-
rupting) contaminants in the environment. "69 
The absence of conclusive causal links, however, does not 
mean that the legal and regulatory communities should ig-
nore the dangers of EDCs. Although further research is 
necessary to understand EDC risks, exposure routes, and 
mechanisms of harm, the studies linking EDCs to repro-
ductive disorders and other health problems in animals and 
humans suggest that precautionary legal responses should 
at least be considered. Though the health effects of EDCs 
seem to be more subtle than those of DES, the DES experi-
ence should seiVe as a warning of the damage that EDCs 
may be causing to the human population. 
If the scientific case against EDCs grows stronger over the 
next few years, courts and/or regulatory agencies may re-
spond even if they do not have conclusive evidence of 
cause-and-effect relationships. Certainly, tort law has 
never required absolute proof of causation in to.xics cases, 70 
68. EPA RISK AssESSMENT FORUM, supra note 9, at 6. 
69. COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 196. Elaborating on causation problems, 
Colborn and her colleagues explain that "(a]lthough we know that every mother in 
the past half century has carried a load of synthetic chemicals and exposed her 
children in the womb, we do not know what combination of chemicals any indi-
vidual child was exposed to, or at what levels. or whether he or she was hit during 
critical periods in their development when relatively low levels might have sign1fl-
cant lifelong effects.· Id. 
70. See infra Part V(A) for a discussion of causation in toxic tort cases generally 
and in potential EDC litigation in particular. 
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and regulatory agencies should require an even lower stan-
dard of proof than the courts before considering precau-
tionary regulation of environmental pollutants. 71 
Courts and regulatory agencies have frequently faced the 
challenge of evaluating new risks about which there is sci-
entific controversy. This challenge arises because technol-
ogy evolves at a rapid pace, much faster than the law, and 
continually creates new risks along with its benefits. Some 
obseiVers advocate caution in crafting legal responses to 
new or newly-identified risks, advising restraint until the 
data are more conclusive or until there is greater scientific 
consensus. Regarding EDCs, for example, John Holtzman 
of the Chemical Manufacturers Association maintains that 
"[l]eap[ing) from theory to public policy is pretty risky when 
there are multiple interpretations of what the data mean. "72 
Peter Huber, a leading critic of the U.S. regulatory system, 
has suggested that the law overreacts to new risks and dis-
regards the hazards of older, established technologies.73 
Judge Posner's dictum that "[l]aw lags science; it does not 
lead it"74 rightfully cautions against overzealous legal re-
sponses to new risks, especially from the courts. 
Protection of public health, however, often requires action 
in the face of uncertainty. Law should not lead science, but 
neither should government officials ignore clear danger sig-
nals. This article acknowledges the preliminary nature of 
scientific findings regarding endocrine disruption and ex-
amines the potential for regulatory action and litigation in 
the context of scientific understanding becoming stronger 
71. Compared to tort judgments, regulation is more appropriate to address un-
certain risks and causal mechanisms. For example, regulations might impose 
minimal restrictions on uses of a chemical when there is some evidence, but not 
conclusive evidence, that the chemical causes harm. Tort law's remedy of fully 
shifting injury costs should be imposed only when there is more substantial proof 
of causation. 
72. Cynthia Crossen, Clamorous Pro and Con Campaigns Herald Book's Launch, 
WALL STREET JOURNAL, March 7, 1996 at Bl. 
73. Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best The Hazards of Public Risk Man-
agement in the Courts, 85 CoLUM. L.REv. 277, 307-314 (1985) (arguing that courts 
focus on new risks from new technology, ignoring potentially greater risks from 
existing, accepted technology). 
74. Rosen v. Ciba-Getgy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 
117 S.Ct. 73 (1996). (Ruling that expert scientific testimony on link between 
nicotine patch and heart attack was not valid scientific evidence and inadmissi-
ble). 
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over the next several years. Many observers of the endo-
crine disruption issue believe that the present state of sci-
entific knowledge is too limited to support a legal response. 
Because the research conducted to date raises serious 
questions about the risks of EDCs, however, it is appropri-
ate to examine the legal and regulatm:y tools that might be 
used to respond to EDC risks should the scientific case 
against EDCs continue to strengthen. · 
III. TYPES OF SUSPECTED EDCs 
Since World War II, society has witnessed a "chemical 
revolution" in which the production and use of synthetic 
chemicals has increased dramatically. Although we have 
undeniably benefited from new chemicals in areas such as 
medicine, agriculture, and packaging, many chemicals are 
known carcinogens and others may be hazardous but have 
not been adequately tested. 
The overwhelming majority of chemicals in use in the 
United States have never been required to be tested for 
health risks. While our primary toxics statute, the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (TSCA) of 1976,75 permits the EPA 
to mandate testing of chemicals, it has been largely ineffec-
tive because it creates burdensome factual and legal hur-
dles for the EPA before the agency can take regulatory ac-
tion.76 Since the passage of the Act, EPA has developed 
testing rules for less than one percenf7 of the 75,000 syn-
thetic chemicals currently listed on EPA's Toxic Substances 
Inventory.78 Even when a chemical is tested pursuant to 
TSCA, it is the manufacturer, and not the EPA, that per-
forms the actual testing. We are essentially "flying blind"79 
in permitting the marketing and use of thousands of chemi-
cals with very little information about their health impacts. 
·It is partly because so few chemicals are required to be 
tested that scientists are just beginning to understand the 
properties and risks of EDCs. Over fifty chemicals are sus-
75. 15 u.s.c. §§ 2601-2692 (1994). 
76. See infra Part N for a further discussion ofTSCA 
77. DAVID ROE ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FuND, TOXIC IGNORANCE 26 (1997). 
<http:/ I www.ecif.org/ pubs I reports/ toxicfgnorance I index.html>. 
78. See EDSTAC REPORr, supra note 10, at 2-10. 
79. COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 239; see generally id., chapter 14. 
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pected of being EDCs,80 though estimates vary and identifi-
cation research is still ongoing. Much of the research into 
endocrine disruption has focused on a few classes of 
chemicals, such as PCBs or DDT, which scientists pave al-
ready studied for other reasons.81 The main classes of 
EDCs are described below: 
Organochlorine Pesticides: This category includes DDT, 
DDE, and dicofol, as well as the pesticides perthane, aldrin, 
chlordane, heptachlor, and hexachlorobenzene.82 The pes-
ticides dieldrin, endosulfan, methoxychlor, and kepone are 
also suspected EDCs.83 While the EPA severely r~strtcted 
use of DDT in 1972,84 other countries still produce and use 
it. DDT has a chemical structure similar to DES,85 and 
DDT persists in the U.S. environment because it and its 
break-down products accumulate in wildlife86 and stay in 
the foodchain.87 One DDT break-down product, DDE, has 
been found to be an androgen receptor antagonist, blocking 
the binding of natural male hormones to their receptors. 88 
DDE can cross the placenta to reach developing human 
fetuses and has been shown to inhibit male sexual charac-
teristics in rats. 89 Other organochlorine pesticides still used 
on crops have both estrogenic and anti-androgenic effects,90 
and some studies have suggested a link between body levels 
of organochlorine pesticides and breast cancer.91 
80. See COLBORN ET AL .• supra note 3. at 81. 
81. See id. 
82. See Toppart et al., supra note 2. at 756. 
83. See Thomas E. Weise & William R Kelce, An Introduction to Environmental 
Oestrogens, CHEMISI'RY AND INDUSTRY, August 18, 1997. 
84. 37 Fed. Reg. 13,369 (1972). . 
85. See CoLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 69 (diagramming structures). 
86. See Richard L. Williamson et al., Gathering Danger: The Urgent Need to 
Regulate Toxic Substances That Can Bioaccwnu1ate, 20 EcOLOGY L.Q. 605, 609-
613 (1993) (listing organochlorine pesticides and PCBs as substances with a 
"high" or "very high" capacity to accumulate in the fatty lipids of wildlife as the 
chemicals are passed up the food chain). 
87. See id. at 609, 612. 
88. See Kelce et al., Persistent DUI' Metabolite p,p'-DDE is a Potent Androgen Re-
ceptor Antagonist, 375 NATIJRE 581 (June 15, 1995). 
89. See id. 
90. See Toppart et al., supm note 2, at 756-757. 
91. See Wolff, supm note 48, at 88-89. 
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Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs): PCBs are industrtal 
chemicals that have been used since 1929 as heat transfer 
and hydraulic fluids, adhesives, flame retardants, dielectrtc 
fluids for electrtcal equipment, and waxes. 92 Congress 
banned most production of PCBs in 1976,93 but like DDT. 
PCBs persist in the environment and in the food chain, es-
pecially in fish that live in polluted waters. 94 PCBs have 
both estrogenic and anti-androgenic effects. 95 Dioxin, a 
form of PCB whose cancer-causing properties were brought 
to public attention in the early 1980's by the contamination 
of Times Beach, Missouri, is also a suspected EDC.96 Di-
oxin is produced as a byproduct of incineration, paper and 
pulp bleaching, and emissions from steel foundries and 
motor vehicles. 97 
Alkylphenol Etlwxylates (APEs): APEs, which are estro-
genic, are used widely in detergents, paints, herbicides, 
pesticides, and cosmetics. 98 Over 300 million kilograms of 
APEs are produced annually worldwide. 99 APEs accumulate 
in rivers, entering the water directly from fields or through 
sewage treatment plants, and they also accumulate in the 
bodies of fish and birds. 100 British studies have indicated 
that thirty percent of drinking water in the United Kingdom 
is taken from rivers contaminated with APEs. 101 Denmark 
has already phased out most uses of APEs because of their 
endocrine disrupting properties. 102 One APE, nonylphenol 
ethoxylate, also known as nono:xynol-9, is widely used as a 
spermicide and condom lubricant. 103 
92. See Top pari et al .• supra note 2, at 757. 
93. See Toxic Substances Control Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (1994). 
94. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 26. 
95. See Top pari et al., supra note 2, at 757. 
96. See id. 
97. See id. 
98. See id. at 758. 
99. See id. 
100. See Michael Warhurst, Hormone Disrupting Chemicals Website, (last modi-
fied Nov. 25, 1998) <http:/ /easyweb.easynet. co.uk/-mwarhurst>. 
101. See Peter Fairley et al., Endocrine Disruptors: Sensationalism or Science?, 
CHEMICAL WEEK, May 8, 1996 at 29. 
102. See fd. 
103. See Weise & Kelce, supra note 83. 
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Phthalates: This class of suspected EDCs is found in vinyl 
products, paint, and plastics (including plastic films used 
for food packaging), as well as in processed foods such as 
cheese, margarine, and baby formula. 104 One type of 
phthalate, DEHP (diethylhexylphthalate}, is believed to be a 
testicular toxicant. 105 Another common type, BBP (butyl-
benzylphthalate), is estrogenic and has been associated 
with reduced sperm production and testicle size in male 
rats exposed in utero and in early life to levels close to cal-
culated human levels of exposure.106 
Bisphenol-A: Bisphenol-A has an estrogenic effect and has 
been found to cause estrogen-sensitive breast cancer cells 
to proliferate.107 The chemical has gained particular notori-
ety because it is used widely in the packaging industry in 
products such as plastic water bottles and in the inner 
coating of food cans and bottle caps. 108 Very low levels of 
Bisphenol-A have been shown to cause endocrine disrup-
tion. In one study, doses of two micrograms per kilogram of 
body weight given to pregnant mice resulted .in male off-
spring with prostate glands 30o/o larger than male offspring 
in control groups. 109 Bisphenol-A is used in some dental 
fillings, where concentrations of 5-30 micrograms per milli-
liter have been found in saliva one hour after a filling. 110 
Phytoestrogens: Phytoestrogens are naturally-occurring 
estrogenic and anti-estrogenic chemicals found in plants, 
including edible plants such as spinach, sprouts, and soy-
beans.u1 Because soybeans are used so widely in food 
products, including infant formula, they may be a major 
104. SeeWarhurst. supra note 100. 
105. See AMDUR ET AL., CASAREIT AND Douu:s TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SciENCE OF 
POISONS 499 (1991). 
106. See RM. Sharpe et al .• Gestational and Lactational Exposure of Rats to Xe-
noestrogens Results in Reduced Testicular Size and Spenn Production, 103 ENvn.. 
HEAL1li PERSPECTIVES 1136-1143 (1995). 
107. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 135. 
108. See td.. 
109. See Weise & Kelce, supra note 83. 
110. See td.. 
111. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 80. OUR SToLEN FuroRE suggests that 
plants may have developed phytoestrogenic properties through evolution as a 
means to disrupt the endocrine systems. and thus the reproduction. of predator 
animals. Id. at 76-77. 
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source of human EDC intake. 112 
These categories of suspected EDCs are not exhaustive. A 
number of other chemical types are under investigation, 
and scientists simply do not know the full range of chemi-
cals that may cause endocrine disruption. Faced with this 
lack of knowledge about the health effects of most chemi-
cals, the EPA's Endocrine Disruptor Screening and Testing 
Advisory Committee (EDSTAC) recommends investigating 
87,000 different chemicals for endocrine disrupting ef-
fects.113 
To be sure, some chemicals that affect the endocrine 
system have positive applications, including those used for 
birth control, treatment of osteoporosis and ·heart disease, 
and therapies for prostate and breast cancer. 114 Scientists 
are still trying to understand which types and degrees of 
impacts on the. endocrine system cause harm and which 
cause no effect or have net benefits. 
An important question from both the scientiftc and legal 
perspectives is whether the amount of human exposure to 
EDCs is sufficient to cause harm, especially given that 
EDCs are generally less potent than natural hormones. 
The estrogenic activity of DDT in the environment, for ex-
ample, is one thousand to one million times less potent 
than natural estradiol' in the body. 115 A study funded in 
part by the Chemical Manufacturers Association found that 
the daily dose of estrogen-equivalent from a birth control 
pill was 6.67 billion times greater than the expected daily 
dose from organochlorine compounds in the environment. 116 
Toppart and his colleagues respond that "[w]hile exposure 
levels to estrogenic chemicals are not at all well-known for 
humans, the large number of chemicals in numerous envi-
112. See Toppart et al., supm note 2, at 758. See also Weise & Kelce, supm 
note 83. The EDSTAC has recommended inclusion of naturally occurring estro-
gens in a screening and te~ting program because they are ubiquitous and because 
they may have additive and antagonistic effects with other hormonally active 
chemicals. SeeEDSTAC REPORT, supranote 10, at 7-10. 
113. EDSTAC REPORT, supra note 10, at ES-3. For further discussion of 
EDSTAC, see Part N(C)(l), infra. 
114. See id. at 3-6. 
115. See Toppari et al, supm note 2, at 756. 
116. Safe, supm note 38, at 349. 
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ronmental categories suggests adequate availability.''117 
That some suspected EDCs can accumulate in fish and 
wildlife may heighten human dietary exposure. as "biomag-
nificatlon" in the food chain can concentrate chemicals in 
fish and wildlife to levels as much as one mill1on times 
higher than the ambient concentration in water or land en-
vironments. 118 
An additional consideration is that fetuses might be dam-
aged by levels of EDCs that would not harm adults because 
homeostatic mechanisms that maintain hormonal balance 
are not well-developed in fetuses. 119 Also. fetal hormone re-
ceptors might not be as discriminating among hormones as 
adult receptors. 120 Finally. it might be misleading to put too 
much weight on the potency of EDCs compared to natural 
hormones. Because natural hormones can modulate cell 
activity in concentrations in the parts-per-trtllion range. a 
less potent hormone concentrated in the bloodstream in the 
parts-per-bill1on range or less might still have deleterious 
effects. 121 
N. POTENfiAL REGULATION OF EDCs 
A. Current Endocrine Disruption Programs 
Over the past few years. several federal agencies have 
launched programs to examine the risks of EDCs and to 
develop testing, screening, and research recommendations. 
From the public literature. it appears that no government 
agency is currently considering regulatory action beyond 
testing and screening. The federal government effort is co-
ordinated by the Committee on Environment and Natural 
Resources (CENR) of the National Science and Technology 
Council (NSTC).122 The CENR's working group on endocrine 
117. Topparl et al .• supra note 2, at 769. 
118. See Williamson et al .• supra note 86. at 614. 
119. SeeEPARisKAssESSMENTFORUM, supranote9, at 19-20. 
120. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 74. 
121. See td. See Gina Solomon. Endocrine Disruptors, What Should We Do Noufl 
(Mar. 19, 1997) <http://www.nrdc.org/nrdc/nrdcpro/present/gs031997.htm1>. 
122. See UNrrED STAn:5 ENviRONMENTAL PROTEC'l10N AGENCY, ENDOCRINE 
DISRUPI'ORS REsEARCH INmATIVE FACT SHEET (Nov. 25, 1998) 
<http://www.epa.gov/endocrine/edrifact.html>. 
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disruption includes representatives from the White House, 
Environmental Protection Agency, Department of the Inte-
rior, National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, 
Centers for Disease Control, Department of Agriculture, and 
a number of other federal agencies. 123 
International efforts to regulate endocrine disruptors have 
evolved considerably over the past five years. In June and 
July of 1998, representatives from over one hundred coun-
tries met in Montreal to begin negotiations on a global 
treaty to regulate Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs): 
toxic chemicals that persist in the environment and that 
can be transported globally through water and air pollution 
and the migration of species. 124 Many of the twelve POPs on 
which the negotiators focused efforts, such as chlordane, 
DDT, heptachlor, and PCBs, are also suspected endocrine 
disruptors. 125 The United States has already banned or re-
stricted most of the twelve chemicals, but it is participating 
actively in the negotiations because of the government's 
concern about environmental transport of the chemicals 
from other countries. 126 Conducted under the auspices of 
the United Nations Environment Programme, the treaty ne-
gotiations are expected to be completed in the year 2000. 127 
It is currently unclear whether the global treaty will involve 
restrictions, phase-outs, or different requirements for the 
developed and developing world. 126 Assuming that the 
treaty is completed and that it is . ratified by the Senate, 
domestic legislation might still be needed to implement the 
123. See id. 
124. See Joby Warrick, 120 Cowttrles to Try to Reach Pact on Phaseout of Toxic 
Compounds, WASH. Posr. June 28, 1998, atA3. 
125. The twelve chemicals are aldrin. chlordande, DDT. dieldrin, dioxins. en-
drin, furans, heptachlor. hexachlorobenzene, mtrex. PCBs, and toxaphene. See 
United Nations Environment Programme, Press Release, "Treaty talks start on 
persistent organic pollutants," (June 29, 1998) <http:/ /lrptc.unep.ch/pops/POPs_ 
Inc/press_releases/fnfokfte.html#treaty>. 
126. See Warrick, supra note 124 (quoting Rafe Pomerance, the State Depart-
ment's deputy assistant secretary for the environment. as stating that *(m)any of 
these problems we cannot solve alone. They exist and are created outside our 
borders."). 
127. UNEP Press Release, supra note 125. 
128. See UNEP document "The international community's response to POPs." 
(June 1998)<1rptc. unep.ch/pops/POPs_Inc/press_releases/fnfokfte.html# 
response> (descrtbing special needs of developing countrtes. the possibility of 
technology transfers, and possible treaty provisions including bans on certain 
chemicals and provisions to promote release reductions). 
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treaty. Such legislation could become controversial, espe-
cially if the treaty regime restricts additional chemicals cur-
rently mass-marketed in the United States. 
In the United States, the Environmental Protection 
Agency has taken the lead on endocrine disruption initia-
tives. In 1996, the EPA's Office of Prevention, Pesticides, 
and Toxic Substances (OPPI'S) established the Endocrine 
Disruptor Screening and Testing Advisory Committee 
(EDSTAC) to "provid[e] direction to the Agency on the es-
tablishment of a comprehensive screening and testing pro-
gram for pesticides and chemicals for estrogenic and other 
endocrine effects. "129 The screening program planned by the 
EDSTAC was mandated by Congress in the Food Quality 
Protection Act (FQPA),130 signed into law on August 3, 1996, 
and by amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act 
(SDWA), 131 signed into law on August 6, 1996. 
In the FQPA, Congress required the EPA to determine 
"whether certain substances may have an effect . . . simi-
lar ... to a naturally occurring estrogen, or such other en-
docrine effect as the Administrator may designate. "132 Con-
gress directed the EPA to screen all registered pesticides 
and any other substance that may have an effect that is 
"cumulative" to an effect of a pesticide, 133 and the amend-
ments to the SDWA gave the EPA authority to screen any 
other substance that may be found in drinking water 
sources and that may have an endocrine-disrupting ef-
fect. 134 Although chemical manufacturers will conduct the 
actual testing, Congress gave the EPA authority to suspend 
sale or distribution of a chemical if a finn fails to submit 
the requested testing data. 135 
In the FQPA, Congress placed the endocrine screening 
129. U.S. ENviRONMENTAL PROTECnON AGENCY, OFFICE OF PREvENilON, 
PEsTICIDES, AND TOXIC SUBSrANCES, FOOD QUAUIY PROTECnON Acr IMPLEMENTATION 
PLAN, (Mar. 1997), at 4.7 <http://www.pestlaw.com/guide/EPA-70300B.html>. 
130. Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170. 
131. Safe Drinking Water Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182. 
132. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(p)(l) (Sl:lPP· 1997). 
133. Id. at§ 346a(p)(3). 
134. See42 U.S.C. § 300j-17 (Supp. 1996). The EDSfAC decided to expand the 
scope of the screening program to include "all environmental agents~ and is pri-
oritizing which agents to screen first. See FooD QUAUIY PROTECriON Acr 
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 129, at 4.7. 
135. See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(p)(5) (Supp. 1997). 
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program on a very tight schedule, requiring the EPA to de-
velop the screening procedures within two years of enact-
ment (i.e., by mid-1998), 136 and to implement the program 
within three years of enactment (i.e., by mid-1999). 137 By 
mid-2000, the EPA is required to report to Congress on its 
findings, recommendations for further testing of EDCs, and 
recommendations for possible regulatory action. 138 Because 
the EPA cannot possibly screen every commercial chemical 
within that time-period, it must prioritize which chemicals 
and pesticides will be screened first, and it is requesting 
voluntary industry compliance with the screening program 
in order to meet the statutory deadlines. Lynn Goldman, 
former Assistant EPA Administrator for OPPI'S, explained in 
1996 that "if we have to do this through rule-making proc-
esses it will take an inordinate amount of time and effort. "139 
Most importantly from a regulatory perspective, Congress 
gave the EPA wide latitude to take protective measures 
against EDCs. If the EPA finds that a certain chemical does 
have an "endocrine effect," the FQPA directs the EPA Ad-
ministrator, "as appropriate," to "take action under such 
statutory authority as is available to the Administrator ... 
to ensure the protection of public health. "140 Congress did 
not provide new regulatory authority with this provision, 
but this provision does demonstrate that Congress antici-
pated that some regulation of EDCs might be necessary 
under existing statutes. The question naturally arises, 
then, of whether the current statutes governing toxic 
chemicals are adequate to address the risks of EDCs. 
B. Current Statutory Authority to Regulate EDCs 
Because EDCs are found in pesticides, food, air, water, 
occupational settings, and consumer products, an enor-
mous variety of statutes could potentially be relevant in any 
regulatory regime for EDCs. These include the Federal In-
secticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), the Food, 
136. Id. at§ 346a(p)(l). EDSTAC released its final report on schedule in August 
1998. 
137. Id. at§ 346a(p)(2). 
138. See td. at§ 346a(p)(7). 
139. Fairley et al., supra note 101 at 36. 
140. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(p)(6) (Supp. 1997). 
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Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA}, the Clean Air Act (CAA}, 
the Clean Water Act (CWA}, the Safe Drtnking Water Act 
(SDWA), the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA}, the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA}, and the Con-
sumer Product Safety Act (CPSA). The federal government, 
rather than the states, has taken primacy responsibility for 
toxic chemical regulation, 141 and the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency sets the regulatory standards for most of the 
federal toxics statutes. 142 This discussion will therefore fo-
cus on the EPA. 
Regulating EDCs under existing statutes would be prob-
lematic for a number of reasons. The existing statutory re-
gime for toxic chemicals has many flaws, including frag-
mented agency authority, 143 media-specific approaches, 144 
inconsistent lists of chemicals regulated under different 
statutes,145 command-and-control methodology, 146 and 
chemical-by-chemical standard setting. 147 Proceeding under 
existing statutes,· then, will merely replicate in the EDC 
context the same flaws that have plagued regulation of 
141. States play a limited role in federal environmental regulation. For example, 
they grant permits and develop Implementation plans for federal standards under 
statutes such as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act. See Williamson et al., 
supra note 86, at 646-647 & n.204. 
142. EPA shares regulatory authority under the FDCA with the Food and Drug 
Administration, for example. OSHA, which regulates exposure to toxic chemicals 
in the workplace, is Implemented by the Occupational Safety and Health Admini-
stration. The CPSA is Implemented by the Consumer Product Safety Commission. 
143. See Williamson et al., supra note 86, at 643-644 (stating that most fields 
regulated by the U.S. government, from aircraft safety to television and radio 
broadcasting, fall under a single statute, whereas toxic chemicals are regulated 
under at least nine statutes). 
144. See John C. Dembach, The Urifocused Regulatton of Toxic and Hazardous 
PoUutants, 21 HARv. ENVn.. L.REv. 1, 43-45 (1997) (arguing that statutes generally 
cover a single medium, such as air or water, and ignore pollutant transport be-
tween media). 
145. See id. at 1-6 (noting vast inconsistencies in the lists of pollutants regu-
lated under five different toxics statutes and arguing that these inconsistencies 
encourage discharges of pollutants regulated under one statute into unregulated 
media). 
146. See Williamson et al., supra note 86, at 647 (noting lack of market mecha-
nisms in toxics regulation). See also Richard Stewart. The Future of Environmental 
Regulation: United States Environmental Regulation: A FaUing .Parodlgm. 15 J.L. & 
COM. 585, 587 (1996) (noting difficulty of gathering information to Implement 
command-and-control measures and economic inefficiency of such measures). 
147. See Williamson et al., supra note 86, at 647 (noting that chemical-by-
chemical testing leads to highly stringent limitations on a few chemicals, while the 
vast majority of chemicals remain unregulated). 
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other pollutants. To be sure, U.S. toxics statutes are 
broadly written to permit the EPA to take regulatmy action 
when new chemical risks are discovered. That is, existing 
statutes provide sufficient authority to regulate EDCs. Be-
cause of difficulties that will arise in setting standards, 
drafting sensible regulations, and defending those regula-
tions in court, however, the overall usefulness of proceeding 
under existing statutes to protect public health from EDC 
risks is limited. These obstacles would hinder regulatocy 
action on the hazards of a given EDC even if there was con-
siderable data. 
Regulatocy obstacles are discussed in more detail in Part 
IV(C), infra, but first it is useful to outline how regulation of 
EDCs might be incorporated into the existing statutocy re-
gime for toxics. This discussion will focus on three major 
statutes: the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenti-
cide Act (FIFRA), the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 
and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). 
FIFRA. 148 The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, & Rodenti-
cide Act provides that-all pesticides must be registered with 
the EPA before sale or distribution. 149 Before approving a 
registration, the EPA Administrator must find that the pes-
ticide will perform as intended without "any unreasonable 
risk to man or the environment, taking into account the 
economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of 
the use of any pesticide."150 FIFRA is a classic cost-benefit 
balancing statute. The burden is on the pesticide manu-
facturer to produce sufficient safety information to allow the 
EPA to determine that the benefits of the pesticide outweigh 
possible hazards. FIFRA also provides the authority to can-
cel existing pesticide registrations under a similar cost-
benefit analysis if new information about pesticide hazards 
comes to light. 151 In addition, FIFRA grants emergency 
148. 7 u.s.c. §§ 136-136y (1994). 
149. Id. at§ 136a(a). 
150. /d. at§ 136(bb). The EPA Administrator shall classify a pesticide for re-
stricted use if the pesticide "may generally cause ... unreasonable adverse effects 
on the environment, including injury to the applicator." /d. at§ 136a(d)(1)(C). 
151. In determining whether to suspend a pesticide registration for unreason-
able adverse impacts of the environment, the Administrator must consider the im-
pact on "production and prices of agricultural commodities, retail food prices, and 
otherwise on the agricultural economy." Id. at§ 136d(b). The EPA is currently re-
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authortty to the EPA to immediately suspend registrations 
to address an "imminent hazard. "152 In the context of EDCs, 
then, FIFRA would provide the EPA with authortty to ban or 
limit the use of new or existing pesticides because of endo-
crtne disrupting effects, as long as such action survived the 
rough cost-benefit analysis of the statute. Under the stat-
ute, the EPA approves the pesticide labels proposed by reg-
istrants, and it would have the power to mandate warnings 
about endocrtne disrupting effects on pesticide contain-
ers.153 
TSCA. 154 The 1976 Toxic Substances Control Act is the 
broadest of the major toxics statutes, as it applies to all 
new non-pesticide chemicals and to non-pesticide chemi-
cals already on the market. Under TSCA, the EPA Admin-
istrator can mandate that a manufacturer test any chemical 
that "may present an unreasonable rtsk of injury to health 
or the environment."155 Effects for which tests can be man-
dated include carcinogenesis, mutagenesis, teratogenesis, 
behavioral disorders, and cumulative or synergistic ef-
fects, 156 all of which could be relevant to EDCs. 
In practice, the EPA has focused its chemical testing pro-
gram on "new" chemicals developed after the passage of the 
Act. The vast majortty of so-called "existing" chemicals that 
were already in commerce when TSCA was passed, includ-
ing many suspected EDCs, have never beeri required to be 
tested for health rtsks. Even for "new" chemicals, testing is 
registering all pesticides registered before November 1, 1984, Id. at§ 136a-l(a), so 
older pesticides will be subjected to review over the next decade or so for health 
risks, including risks of endocrine disruption. 
152. Id. at§ 136d(c). Cancellation procedures can take years, whereas suspen-
sion takes effect immediately, but suspension is merely a stopgap measure until 
full cancellation hearings can be held. Because of the adversartal nature of can-
cellation proceedings and court delays, they are used infrequently. Suspected en-
docrine disruptors such as DDT and Kepone were cancelled (not for their endo-
crine disrupting effects) under such proceedings. See MARY DEVINE WOROBEC & 
GIRARD ORDWAY, TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL GUIDE 60 ( 1989). 
153. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(B) (1994). 
154. 15 u.s.c. §§ 2601-2692 (1994). 
155. Id. at § 2603(a)(l). Testing can also be mandated if the chemical (1) is or 
will be produced in substantial quantities or (2) if there will be significant or sub-
stantial human exposure or if the chemical will enter the environment in sub-
stantial quantities. Id. 
156. See td. at§ 2603(b)(2)(A). 
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rarely required. An EPA advisory group, noting that the 
EPA has ordered testing for only 121 chemicals in twenty 
years under TSCA, explains that "[t]his is not an indication 
of how much more information might really be needed but, 
rather, the administrative challenges of mounting an infor-
mation request. "157 
Although TSCA mandates that companies submit Pre-
Manufacture Notifications (PMNs) to the EPA, 158 EPA regu-
lations require submission only of available toxicity data 
that is in the company's possession or in scientific litera-
ture. 159 Companies are not required to develop their own 
toxicity information through testing, and over half of PMNs 
are submitted with no toxicity data whatsoever. 160 Conse-
quently, unlike pesticides under FIFRA, most chemicals in 
commerce today are being sold without fully developed 
safety information and without informed EPA review. 
The EPA can restrict a chemical pursuant to TSCA only if 
it can reasonably conclude that the chemical "presents an 
unreasonable risk of injucy to health or the_ environment. "161 
This risk analysis must be balanced with an analysis of the 
benefits of the chemical, the availability of substitutes, and 
the "reasonably ascertainable economic consequences" of 
the regulation. 162 - Available restrictions include limiting 
uses or production volumes, mandating warnings, prohib-
iting manufacture or distribution, or regulating disposal. 163 
These restrictions could in theocy ameliorate EDC risks. 
The EPA rarely restricts chemicals once they are on the 
market, however, because the required cost-benefit analysis 
is cumbersome and because regulations must be the "least 
burdensome" available to address the risk. 164 In TSCA's 
first twenty years, EPA imposed restrictions on only five 
types of chemicals. 165 
Although TSCA has many limitations, the statute at the 
157. EDSTAC REPORr. supra note 10. at 2-11. 
158. 15 u.s.c. § 2604 (1994). 
159. See 40 C.F.R. § 720.50 (1998) .. 
160. See ROE ET AL., supra note 77, at 27. 
161. 15 U.S.C. at§ 2605(a). 
162. Id. at§ 2605(c)(1). 
163. See id. at§ 2605(a). 
164. !d. 
165. See ROE ET AL., supra note 77, at 28. The chemicals are dioxin, hexavalent 
chromium, PCBs, metal fluids, and lead paint. Id.. at n.38. 
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very least would provide the basic authority to ban or limit 
chemicals or mandate warnings once more information 
about the endocrine hazards of individual chemicals be-
comes available. 
FDCA. 166 The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act gives the EPA 
the responsibility to set "tolerances," or allowable levels, for 
pesticide residue on food. 167 Foods that contain pesticide 
residue above the established tolerance are considered 
adulterated and violate the Act. 168 The agency must set tol-
erances that are "safe," defined as "a reasonable certainty 
that no harm will result from aggregate exposure to the 
pesticide chemical residue, including all anticipated dietary 
exposures and all other exposures for which there is reli-
able information. "169 This language would provide the 
authority to revoke or modify tolerances for pesticides sus-
pected of causing harm through endocrine disruption. That 
is, the "harm" that is a precedent for regulatory action is 
not defined narrowly as a specific disease or cancer, but 
rather is broad enough to encompass reproductive harm, 
decreased fertility, or other health problems that have been 
linked to EDCs. 
Significantly, the FQPA directed the EPA to review all cur-
rent pesticide tolerances within 10 years. 170 In reviewing 
tolerances, the EPA may now consider "whether the pesti-
cide chemical may have an effect in humans that is similar 
to an effect produced by a naturally occurring estrogen or 
other endocrine effects."171 Additionally, the FQPA man-
dated that in setting or reviewing pesticide residue levels, 
the Administrator shall assess the health risk based on 
"available information concerning the special susceptibility 
of infants and children to the pesticide chemical residues, 
including . . . effects of in utero exposure to pesticide 
166. 21 u.s.c. §§ 301-395 (1994). 
167. Id. at§ 346a. 
168. See id.. at§ 342(a). 
169. Id. at§ 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii). The Administrator is permitted to set a tolerance 
higher than the "safe" level if the pesticide protects against a health risk greater 
than the health risk from the residue, or if a higher tolerance "is necessary to 
avoid a significant disruption in domestic production of an adequate, wholesome, 
and economical food supply. • ld. at § 346a(b)(2)(B)(ill). 
170. Id. at § 346a(q)(l). 
171. Id. at§ 346a(b)(2)(D)(vill). 
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chemicals."172 The EPA has stated that it will review 10,000 
tolerances by 2006 and that pesticides suspected of endo-
crine disrupting properties and those used on foods most 
eaten by children will receive the highest priority. 173 To 
some extent, then, concerns about endocrine disruption are 
already being incorporated into the existing regulatory re-
gime. 
C. Inadequacies of the Current Regulatory Regime 
The problem with regulating EDCs within the existing 
toxi.cs regulatory framework is not lack of statutory author-
ity. Existing toxi.cs statutes are written broadly enough to 
authorize the EPA or other agencies to place restrictions on 
EDCs if scientific data support such measures, and the 
statutes cover the main exposure routes to EDCs, such as 
pesticides, occupational exposure, and drinking water. 
Rather, the problems in potential regulation of EDCs will 
arise from two other sources: difficulties in risk assessment 
and bureaucratic and judicial obstacles. 
1. Risk Assessment 
The existing risk assessment framework for toxic chemi-
cals is likely to be inadequate for determining the health 
risk from a given EDC and for supporting regulatory action 
against judicial challenge. 174 As Gina Solomon of the Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council writes, "(t]he new problem of 
endocrine disruptors shows that business as usual [at the 
EPA] will not protect our health."175 
The current risk assessment framework for toxic chemi-
cals is premised on (1) testing single chemicals (2) for car-
172. Id. at § 346a(b)(2)(C)(i)UU. _ 
173. See EPA Press Release. Riskiest Pesticides WlU Be Assessed First Under 
New Food Safety Act. August 4, 1997 <www.epa.gov/epahome/Press.html>. 
174. Risk assessment encompasses four sub-procedures: hazard identification 
(linking a chemical to a particular health effect); dose-response assessment (de-
termining the relationship between the magnitude of exposure and the probability 
that the health effect will occur); exposure assessment (determining the level of 
human exposure to the chemical); and risk characterization (combining the re-
sults of the prior steps to determine the overall magnitude of the risk). See 
PERCIVAL ET AL., ENviRONMENTAL REGULATION- LAW, SciENCE, AND POUCY 513-514 
(1996). The special characteristics ofEDCs have the potential to raise problems at 
each stage of the risk assessment process. 
175. Solomon. supra note 121. 
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cinogenic effects (3) by extrapolating backward (4) from high 
doses (5) given to adult animals. 176 This framework is in-
adequate for EDC risk assessment for a number of reasons. 
First, EDCs can disrupt hormonal pathways and modu-
late cell activity at extremely low doses, in the parts-per-
bill1on or parts-per-trtll1on range in the blood stream. 177 The 
EPA screening program or other risk assessment activities 
might miss these subtle effects, and the low-dose problem 
also makes it difficult to set permissible exposures, such as 
pesticide tolerances for food under FDCA, because it is not 
known if there is a safe "threshold" below which no harmful 
effects are expected to occur. 178 
Second, EDCs may have an unusual inverted-U-shaped 
dose-response cmve in which negative health effects in-
crease as the dosage increases, but above a certain dose the 
effects diminish, possibly because hormone receptors be-
come overloaded.179 University of Missouri endocrinologist 
Frederick Vom Saal found this type of dose-response curve 
for DES.180 If this inverted-U-shaped dose-response curve 
exists for other EDCs, it would mean that extrapolating 
health risks from high doses to low doses, far from exagger-
ating risks (which is the usual criticism of dose extrapola-
tions), might actually underestimate them. 181 According to 
Vom Saal, this would be "the end of risk assessment as we 
know it."182 
Third, risk assessment for EDCs is complicated by the 
fact that fertility or reproductive disorders are much more 
difficult to detect in laboratocy animals than cancerous tu-
176. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 198-209. 
177. See text accompanying note 13, supra. 
178. See generally, Short Tenn Screen. for Determining Endocrine Modulation May 
Not Be Possible, PEsTICIDE & TOXIC CHEMICAL NEWS, June 19, 1996 (on difficulties 
with developing EDC screening procedures). See also Yvonne Sor, Fertility or Un-
employment- Should You Have to Choose?. 1 J .L. & HEALnl 141, 167 (1986-1987) 
(discussing lack of evidence regarding threshold levels for chemicals that cause 
birth-defects). 
179. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 169. Most dose-response curves do 
not turn down above a certain dose. That is, the toxic response continues to in-
crease as the dose increases, leading to the risk assessment axiom that "the dose 
makes the poison." Id. at 205. 
180. See id. 
181. See id. at 170. 
182. Michael Lerner, Crossed Signals. WHOLE EAiml. June 22, 1997, at 78. 
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mors. 183 Not only are such disorders intergenerational in 
the case of EDCs, but they are best observed in living ani-
mals, so that traditional rtsk assessment procedures that 
correlate vartous doses of a chemical to mortality rates in 
animals could be inadequate for EDCs. 
Finally, because EDCs are thought to have synergistic ef-
fects, chemical-by-chemical screening, which is a founda-
tion of our current Iisk assessment process for toxics, 
might be inadequate. Yet testing multiple combinations of 
synthetic chemicals and natural hormones could be ex-
tremely time-consuming. 
The EPA's Endocrtne Disruptor Screening and Testing 
Advisozy Committee (EDSTAC) is advising EPA on risk as-
sessment techniques for EDCs. Formed in October 1996, 
the EDSTAC released its Final Report in August 1998.184 
The report outlines a tiered structure for screening and 
testing of chemicals. 185 After initial sorting and prtortty set-
ting stages, Tier 1 screening will identify chemicals capable 
of. interacting with estrogen, androgen, or thyroid hormone 
systems. 186 Tier 2 testing will then determine whether those 
interactions are adverse and will identify, characterize, and 
quantify the adverse effects. 187 After either stage, a chemi-
cal may be moved to a "hold box," which indicates that the 
chemical is not harmful and that no further testing is nec-
essruy.188 The EDSTAC estimates that approximately 
87,000 chemicals will need to be screened, 189 an enormous 
task given the expense of testing and the time needed for 
each test. 
183~ See Williamson et al., supra note 86, at 625 ("Proving human teratogenicity 
is even more difficult than proving carcinogenicity."). 
184. EDSTAC REPORI', supra note 10. 
185. See id. at ES-3 to ES-6. 
186. See id. at ES-4. Tier 1 screening would be designed for maximum sensi-
ttvtty to hormonal effects of chemicals, thus m1n1m1z1ng false negatives. The tests 
would include a range of organisms and assess a range of endocrine disruption 
endpoints. See id. at ES-11. 
187. See id. at ES-14. Tier 2 testing is designed to be more thorough than Tier 
1 screening, and a negative outcome in Tier 2 testing would supercede a positive 
outcome in Tier 1 screening, thus moving the chemical to the "hold box. • EDSTAC 
recommends that Tier 2 testing include a range of organisms in their most sensi-
tive developmental ltfestage and that the tests identify the spectflc hazard caused 
by the chemical and establtsh a dose-response relationship. See id. at ES-13. 
188. See id. at ES-4. 
189. Id.. at ES-3. 
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The ESDTAC has developed initial sorting recommenda-
tions, based on existing data, which could speed the 
screening process by moving a chemical directly to the 
"hold box" if it is already known to be benign, or directly to 
hazard assessment if it is already known to be a harmful 
EDC. 190 For chemicals where existing data are insufficient, 
the EDSTAC recommends High Throughput Pre-Screening 
(HTPS). 191 HTPS is automated, high-volume sampling which 
would provide preliminary hormonal impact information to 
assist in placing chemicals in the correct tier. 192 The EPA 
has indicated that it will begin the screening program in 
1999 using HTPS on 15,000 chemicals. 193 
The EDSTAC seems to recognize the difficult· risk assess-
ment challenges posed by EDCs. It recommends, for exam-
ple, that the EPA develop testing protocols for embryonic 
exposure to chemicals, with evaluation of effects in the fully 
developed animal. 194 It also recommends that the EPA con-
sider tests that detect multiple hormone interactions and 
predict long-term or delayed effects. 195 The EDSTAC did not 
address issues of cost to industry or the length of time 
needed to develop such sensitive tests, both of which could 
be substantial. 196 . Even currently available tests used to 
detect the endocrine-modulating activity of a chemical need 
to be validated and standardized before they could be used 
on a large scale in Tier 1 screening or Tier 2 testing. 197 
In October 1998, the EPA accepted the recommendations 
of the EDSTAC report. 198 According to EPA Administrator 
190. Id. at ES-3 to ES-4. 
191. !d. at ES-8. 
192. See id. The EDSfAC recommends that HTPS be performed on all chemi-
cals wtth current production volumes above 10,000 pounds per year (approxi-
mately 15,000 chemicals). all pesticides, and all chemicals proposed to bypass a 
tier for any reason. Id. . ' 
193. See Glenn Hess, Endocrine Disruption Screening WUl .Evaluate 15,000 
Chemicals, CHEMICALMARKETREPoRIER. October 12, 1998. 
194. EDSfAC REPORratES-12. 
195. See id. at 3-6. 
196. Gary E. Ttmm, technical advisor to the EPA in the Office of Prevention, 
Pesticides, and Toxic Substances, estimates that first tier tests could cost industry 
about $200,000 per chemical, whereas second tier tests could cost about $2 mil-
lion per chemical. See Corinna Wu, Huge Testing Planned for Hormone Mimics; 
Endocrine Disruptors, SciENCE NEWS, September 5, 1998. 
197. SeeEDSfAC REPORt' at ES-15. 
198. See Hess, supra note 193. 
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Carol Browner, the screening program "is a critical first step 
in our efforts to identify any health threats from these sub-
stances and ensure that human health and the environ-
ment are protected. "199 
The EDSTAC was not charged with making recommenda-
tions for what types of test results should justify regulatory 
action, but moving from risk assessment to risk manage-
ment will be controversial. Decisions made during the risk 
assessment process could potentially affect future regula-
tory options. There was considerable controversy during 
the EDSTAC deliberations, for example, over the basic defi-
nition of an endocrine disruptor,200 with opposing camps 
viewing the definition as potentially important to future 
regulatory efforts. One camp advocated defining the term 
as an exogenous agent that "changes endocrine function 
and causes adverse effects .... " Another group of com-
mittee members objected to the use of the term "adverse," 
arguing that the term is subjective and that hormone func-
tion is so sensitive that any biochemical alteration may lead 
to subtle but serious pathologies later in life or in subse-
quent generations. 201 A definition emphasizing WlY hor-
mone effects, and not just demonstrably adverse ones, 
could potentially lead to more regulatory activity in the fu-
ture. To achieve consensus, the EDSTAC finally settled on 
a definition that retains "adverse" but also cites the precau-
tionary principle.202 An endocrine disruptor, according to 
the EDSTAC, is an: 
exogenous chemical substance or mixture that alters the 
structure or functlon(s) of the endocrine system and causes 
adverse effects at the level of the organism, its progeny, 
199. !d. 
200. See Peter Fairley, Low Dose Effects Challenge Risk Assessment Framework. 
CHEMICAL WEEK, July 30, 1997, at 10. 
201. See EDSfAC REPORT, supra note 10, at ES-1. 
202. The precautionary principle has been formulated in different ways, but in 
general holds that policy makers should be cautious in the face of uncertain envi-
ronmental risks. Two authors have described the principle as ensuring "that a 
substance or actlvity posing a threat to the environment is prevented from ad-
versely affecting the environment, even if there is not conclusive scientific proof 
linking that particular substance or activity to environmental damage. • James 
Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The Precautionary Principle: A Fundamental Principle of 
Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment. 14 B.C. INTL & COMP. 
L. REv. 1, 2 (1991). 
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populations, or subpopulations of organisms, based on sci-
entific principles, data, weight-of-evidence, and the precau-
tionary principle. 
If the EPA does decide to regulate EDCs under current 
statutory authority, the agency should recognize the pre-
cautionary principle and the limitations of current risk as-
sessment techniques. It should err on the side of safety in 
deciding whether a suspected EDC should be on the market 
or in setting permissible exposure levels for EDCs, espe-
cially because fetuses and infants appear to be particularly 
vulnerable to endocrine disruption. Greenpeace has argued 
that the chemical industry's testing of its own chemicals for 
endocrine disrupting effects amounts to "cigarette sci-
ence. "203 Although this charge is perhaps premature, that 
risk assessment will be based largely on industry data also 
suggests that the EPA should take a protective, cautious 
approach to standard-setting for EDCs. 
There are limits, of course, to how cautious the EPA can 
be when regulating EDCs. Because the timing of exposure 
appears to be as important as the level of exposure, the 
EPA might theoretically set dosage limits on EDCs so that 
humans would be "safe" at a specified time in hormonal cy-
cles or development when the body is most vulnerable, even 
if at other times the chemical would not cause harm to hu-
mans. Such stringent limits, however, could be politically 
unacceptable, as they could possibly mean severe restric-
tions on certain products and materials. 
2. Bureaucratic and Judicial Obstacles 
In addition to risk assessment problems, the other major 
impediment to responding to EDC risks by proceeding un-
der existing statutory authority is that regulations must 
pass through bureaucratic procedures and court chal-
lenges. The labyrinthine process of moving from risk as-
sessment to rule-making to surviving a court challenge and 
enforcing a regulation will delay implementation of protec-
tive measures and could deter agencies from proposing sci-
entifically sound regulations ex ante. These delays in pro-
posing, revising, justifying, and implementing rules are one 
203. Fairley et al., supra note 101. 
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of the primacy flaws in our current toxics regulatory regime. 
The regulatory process is likely to be particularly vexing in 
the context of EDCs because there is still much scientific 
uncertainty and the risks are just beginning to be under-
stood. 
Before an agency finalizes any future EDC regulation, the 
regulation is likely to be subjected to some form of cost-
benefit analysis. Statutes such as FIFRA or TSCA require 
such analysis, as does President Clinton's Executive Order 
12,886.204 This order requires a full Regulatory Impact As-
sessment, including cost-benefit analysis, for any agency 
rule that has an annual affect on the economy of $100 mil-
lion or more or "adversely affect[s] in a material way the 
economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competi-
tion, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or 
State, local, or tribal governments or communities. "205 
Cost-benefit analysis is a useful tool. Agencies should 
ask the basic question of whether the harm from endocrine 
disruption, taking all uncertainties into account, appears to 
outweigh the costs of restricting a given chemical. The 
problem, however, is that the human health benefits of re-
stricting an EDC may be particularly hard to quantify. The 
costs of industry compliance with regulations are much 
easier to determine and may be weighed too heavily in the 
equation. Further, the burden of performing the cost-
benefit analysis can itself delay or deter sound regulation. 
As Richard Williamson has argued, "given the immense 
data requirements involved, if the burden of performing the 
analysis is placed on the government, the rule-making pro-
cess will slow to a glacial pace and few substances will be 
regulated. "206 
Court challenges to agency rules probably present an 
even larger hurdle to the effective regulation of EDCs. AI-
204. 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (1993) 
205. Id. 
206. Will1amson et al., supra note 86, at 648. Williamson suggests that the 
burden of performing cost-benefit analyses might be shifted to industry. where 
once the government has shown that a substance is toxic. industry would have to 
show that the benefits of the substance outweigh its· costs. But Williamson ac-
knowledges that under such a system. "industry will be forced to endure a stag-
gering burden of cost and delay, • id., and he concludes that "allocation of the bur-
den (of performing the cost-benefit analysis) will nearly always be outcome-
determinative. • Id. at n.211. 
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though an agency might have the statutory authortty to 
regulate EDCs,207 the substance of agency regulations may 
still be challenged in court. Courts would apply one of two 
possible standards of review to agency regulation of EDCs: 
either the "arbitrary and caprtcious" standard applicable to 
informal rule-making under the Administrative Procedure 
Act,208 or the "substantial evidence" standard that is man-
dated by some toxics statutes such as FIFRA and TSCA. 209 
The line between the level of deference granted to agency 
decision-making under the two standards is difficult to 
draw. Even under the less exacting arbitrary and capri-
cious standard, courts carefully scrutinize regulations and 
demand that an agency justify its rule, show that it consid-
ered alternatives to the rule (including suggestions from 
public comments), explain why alternatives were rejected, 
and compile a record of scientific evidence sufficient to 
support the rule.210 
Under either standard of judicial review, a plaintiff such 
as a chemical manufacturer would have a strong chance of 
defeating agency regulation of EDCs, at least in the near 
term, because the scientific understanding of endocrine dis-
ruption is still in its infancy, because of the problems with 
rtsk assessment discussed above, and because of inherent 
limitations of the toxic statutes. 
To be sure, some courts defer to an agency's scientific 
judgments on highly technical matters. In Baltimore Gas & 
207. As discussed above, toxics statutes are written broadly to encompass di-
verse types of harms. Thus, an agency argument that an existing toxics statute 
provides authority to regulate a suspected EDC would probably be considered 
-permissible" under the deferential test enunciated by the Supreme Court in 
Chevron, Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), for judicial review of agency inter-
pretations oflaw. 
208. 5 u.s.c. § 706(2)(a) (1998). 
209. See 7 U.S.C. § 136n(b) (FIFRA substantial evidence standard) and 15 
U.S.C. § 2618(c)(B)(i) (TSCA substantial evidence standard). EPA tolerance deci-
sions under the FDCA are reviewed by judges under the arbitrary and capricious 
standard, except if the EPA Administrator has allowed a public evidentiary hearing 
on a tolerance revision, in which case the decision will be reviewed under the sub-
stantial evidence standard. See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(h)(2). 
210. Searching judicial scrutiny under the arbitrary and capricious standard is 
called -hard look" review because courts require agencies to take a -hard look" at 
possible regulatory responses to the problem that is the subject of the regulation. 
See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfr.'s Ass'n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29 (1983) (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's rescission of passive 
restraint requirements in automobiles struck down under -hard look" review). 
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Electric Company v. NRDC,211 the Supreme Court stated that 
courts should be at their "most deferential" when reviewing 
agency detenninations that are at the "frontiers of sci-
ence."212 Yet even assuming that courts would defer to the 
EPA's scientific detenninations regarding EDCs, the agency 
would nevertheless be saddled with cumbersome statutes, 
such as TSCA, that make it nearly impossible to restrict 
hazardous substances even where .the scientific evidence is 
compelling. In the 1989 case of Corrosion Proof Fittings v. 
EPA, 213 for example, the Fifth Circuit struck down most 
parts of an EPA ban on asbestos, despite the fact that the 
EPA had spent ten years developing the rule and had com-
piled a 45,000 page record to support the ban under 
TSCA.214 The Fifth Circuit held that the EPA had not cho-
sen the "least burdensome" course of action, which TSCA 
requires,215 and that there were irregularities in the EPA's 
cost-benefit analysis.216 The decision was viewed as the 
"death knell" for EPA attempts to ban toxic chemicals under 
TSCA, given the time and labor that EPA committed to 
banning a substance that was widely known to be hazard-
ous. 217 The health risks of asbestos were one of the con-
cems that had prompted Congress to pass TSCA in the first 
place.218 
In general, regulatory agencies have had an abysmal rec-
ord of incorporating new. substances into existing tox:ics 
regulatory programs. Cumbersome statutes, notice and 
comment procedures, and court challenges to agency rules 
211. 462 u.s. 87 (1983). 
212. Id. at 103. The D.C. Circuit has also been generally deferential in review-
ing EPA's scientiftc determinations. See Inti. Fabricare Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 972 F.2d 
384, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("The rationale for deference is particularly strong when 
the EPA is evaluating scientiftc data within its tech . ''lical expertise."); Envt'l. De-
fense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 578 F.2d 337, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (*In an area char-
acterized by scientiftc and technologiCal uncertainty . . . this court must proceed 
with caution. avoiding all temptation to direct the agency in a choice between ra-
tional alternatives."). 
213. 947 F.2d 1201 (5 .. Cir. 1991). 
214. SeePERCIVALETAL., supra note 174, at 568. 
215. See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a). 
216. 947 F.2d at 1215-1220. 
217. See DAN FAGIN & MARIANNE LAVElLE, TOXIC DECEPllON: HOW 1HE CHEMICAL 
INDUS1RY MANIPuLATES SCIENCE, BENDS 1HE LAW, AND ENDANGERS YOUR HEALTif 138 
(1996). 
218. See td. 
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have all contributed to this poor record. The EPA, for ex-
ample, has deleted three pollutants from its list of toxic 
water pollutants since 1976, and has not been able to add 
any pollutants to the list.219 The EPA promulgated stan-
dards for only seven hazardous air toxics under the Clean 
Air Act between the 1970 passage of the Act and the 1990 
Clean Air Act Amendments.220 As Howard Latin of Rutgers 
University put it, "[u]nrealistic judicial requirements for 
comprehensive agency assessments of all potentially rele-
vant factors and for a high degree of scientific precision 
have substantially emasculated environmental control pro-
grams in the past decade. "221 This overall record of agency 
impotence does not augur well for the difficult process of 
justifying potential restrictions on EDCs. 
Assuming courts were ultimately to approve EDC regula-
tions, there is little doubt that the overall process of devel-
oping, justifying, and implementing any potential regulation 
of EDCs would entail enormous cost and delay. For each 
chemical it tries to regulate, the EPA might be faced with 
years of litigation. As the columnist Jessica Matthews 
noted, "[t]he economic stakes involved are so huge and the 
epidemiology to prove cause-and-effect so difficult that the 
regulatory quandaries we could soon be mired in will make 
earlier struggles - over nitrites, saccharin, formaldehyde, 
Times Beach, Love Canal, cholesterol, alar and even to-
bacco - look like kids' stuff. "222 Chemical, pesticide, and 
plastics manufacturers would surely view regulation of 
EDCs as a major threat and would probably invest heavily 
in legal services to defeat any proposed rule. 
In sum, there is a crucial difference between the statutory 
authority available to regulate EDCs, which appears to be 
sufficient, and the practical abUity to promulgate regula-
tions restricting EDCs, which appears to be limited. Al-
though there appear to be numerous problems with regu-
219. See Dembach, supra note 144, at 53. 
220. See Branford C. Mank, What Comes After Technology: Using an ·Exceptions 
Process· to Improve Residual Risk Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 13 srAN. 
ENvTL. L.J. 263, 268 (1994). 
221. Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation. and Toxic Risk Assessment. 5 
YAIEJ. ON REG. 89, 133 (1988). 
222. Jessica Matthews, Overlooking the ·rops· Problem. WASH. Posr, March 11. 
1996, at A19. 
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lating EDCs, the regulatory route should be pursued. The 
prospects for finalizing and implementing regulations will 
improve as scientific understanding of EDCs improves, and 
creative approaches to regulation, possibly involving vol-
untary testing consent orders or new legislation, could be 
utilized to address EDC risks even if the science is not 
completely conclusive. Regulatory approaches to EDCs 
would be more feasible if reviewing courts were sensitive to 
the difficult risk assessment problems surrounding EDCs 
and followed the Supreme Court's admonition to defer to 
agency findings at the frontiers of scientific research. 
V. POTENTIAL LITIGATION OVER ENDOCRINE DISRUPTING 
CHEMICALS 
A Obstacles to SuccessfUl Utigation over EDCs 
Private suits have been an important component of envi-
ronmental protection over the past three decades. Most 
federal environmental statutes have "citizen-suit" provisions 
under which any citizen may either directly sue polluting 
entities to force statutory compliance or sue the EPA to en-
force the statute.223 Common law claims to address toxic 
risks are more unusual, but a number of analysts have 
suggested that tort law can act as a "gap-filler" to protect 
public health and deter polluters where government regula-
tion is incomplete, ineffective, or non-existent.224 In theory, 
private litigation over EDCs could supplement potential 
regulatory efforts and deter manufacturers from producing 
products with harmful chemicals. 
Most common law environmental claims rest on nuisance 
law or theories of strict liability for abnormally dangerous 
223. See Shay S. Scott, Combining Environmental Citizen Suits & Other Private 
Theories of Recovery, 8 J. ENvn.. L. & LIT. 369, 372-380 (1994) (overview of statu-
tory citizen suit provisions). This article does not address statutory-based citizen 
suits because endocrine disruption has not yet been incorporated into any type of 
toxics regulatory regime. See infra Part V. 
224. Marshall S. Shapo, Tort Law and Environmental Risk. 14 PACE ENvn.. L. 
REv. 531, 531 (1997) (describing gap-filling role of tort law); See also Gwyn Good-
son Timms, Note, Statutorily Awarding Attorneys' Fees in Environmental Nuisance 
Suits: Jump Starting the Publlc Watchdog, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1733, 1739 (1992) 
(same). 
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activities, 225 but neither of these doctrines is particularly 
applicable to EDCs. Instead, potential EDC litigation would 
probably be brought under product liability doctrine, where 
the claim would likely be that a chemical (or a product 
containing a chemical) is a defectively designed product 
that has caused bodily harm through endocrine disrup-
tion.226 Failure-to-warn actions could also be possible. 
Although there are some similarities between EDCs and 
other toxic agents that have been the subject of litigation, 
such as asbestos or DES, litigation would probably be an 
ineffective legal response to the health risks of EDCs. Sci-
entific uncertainty and the unusual characteristics of EDCs 
are likely to foreclose litigation as a means to force manu-
facturers to intemalize their costs and compensate injured 
parties. 
Under traditional tort doctrine, a plaintiff must show that 
the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, that the defen-
dant breached this duty,227 and that the breach was the 
cause-in-fact and proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury. 
Proving cause-in-fact is the single largest barrier to suc-
cessful litigation over EDCs. · Indeed, scientific knowledge 
about endocrine disruption is unlikely to reach a point in 
the next decade where it could support legal arguments 
connecting a harm such as breast cancer, testicular cancer, 
or reproductive disorders to a given EDC. 
This is so despite the fact that the tort system does not 
require 100% proof of causation, or even statistically sig-
nificant proof (which most scientists set at 95o/o or 99% 
confidence). Rather, courts have established lower (though 
widely varying) standards for satisfying the burden of 
provilig causation. 228 Some courts require the plaintiff to 
225. See Shapo, supra note 224, at 533-542; Scott, supra note 223, at 381-387. 
226. A number of product liability suits have already been brought against sus-
pected EDCs, but for health concerns other than endocrlne disruption. See, e.g., 
Conde v. Velsicol Chern. Corp. 24 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 1993) (chlordane as defective 
product); Baker v. Monsanto Co., 962 F.Supp 1143 (S.D.Ind. 1997) (failure-to-
warn action against former PCB manufacturer). 
227. Although product liability law is the most likely paradigm for EDC litiga-
tion, the issue of whether an EDC could be found to be a defective product is not 
discussed in this article. The causation hurdle is so formidable that suits would 
probably founder on that ground alone. 
228. See generally, Falcon v. Mem'l. Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 46-48 (Mich.1990) 
(discussing several causation standards in use in various jurisdictions). 
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demonstrate that the defendant's action or product "more 
likely than not" caused the harm. 229 This greater-than-fifty-
percent standard conforms with the general "preponderance 
of the evidence" standard of proof in civil trials. Other 
courts require that the plaintiff show only that the defen-
dant's action or product was a "substantial factor" in caus-
ing the harm, without quantifying "substantial. "230 Finally, 
some courts require plaintiffs to demonstrate that it is a 
"reasonable medical probability" that the defendant caused 
the harm, again without quantifying that phrase. 231 
Regardless of which causation standard is in effect in a 
given jurisdiction, however, an EDC would be unlikely to be 
judged the cause of an injuxy. Although scientists have a 
general understanding of the natural hormonal processes 
regulating reproduction and development, too much is yet 
unknown about how environmental chemicals disrupt the 
endocrine system and modulate cell activity. Though sev-
eral studies have associated EDCs with cancer and repro-
ductive disorders in animals and humans, scientists still 
cannot explain the physical and chemical mechanisms 
through which EDCs cause harm. In short, there is too 
much scientific uncertainty to support causation argu-
ments, and this is likely to be the case for the near future. 
Of course, epidemiological evidence and associational 
studies ~g exposure to harm are not irrelevant to the 
causation issue, and in many toxic tort cases such studies 
are the major evidence offered by the plaintiff. In MerreU 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner, 232 a Bendectin233 case, 
the Texas Supreme Court struggled to develop a causation 
rule that would not completely block plaintiffs in such 
situations from pursuing their claims. This case contains 
229. See. e.g., Parson v. Marathon Oil Co., 960 P.2d 615, 617 (Alaska 1998); 
Hambrick v. Makuch, 491 S.E.2d 71, 72 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). 
230. See. e.g., Rutherl'ord v. Owens-Illinois. Inc., 941 P.2d 1203 (Cal. 1997). 
231. See, e.g., Marks-Brown v. Rogg. 28 S.W.2d 304 fl'ex. 1996); Mauro v. Ray-
mark Indus., Inc .• 561 A2d 257 (N.J. 1989). 
232. 953 S.W.2d 706 fl'ex. 1997). 
233. Bendectln is a morning sickness drug that has been linked to birth defects 
such as malformed limbs. The central issue in most Bendectln litigation is the 
scientific reliability of expert testimony offered by the plaintiff to establish causa-
tion. See t.d. at 708. The U.S. Supreme Court case that developed the standards 
for admissibility of expert testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence, Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharm .• Inc .• 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), was a Bendectln case. 
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one of the most recent extensive discussions by a state su-
preme court on causation problems in toxic tort cases and 
thus provides some indication of how a court might handle 
causation problems in potential EDC litigation. 
The Havner court acknowledged "that a disease or condi-
tion either is or is not caused by exposure to a suspected 
agent, "234 and that "epidemiological studies cannot establish 
that a given individual contracted a disease or condition 
due to exposure to a particular drug or agent. "235 The court 
also recognized, however, that the law should balance the 
cause-in-fact requirement with "the need to compensate 
those who have been injured by the wrongful actions of an-
other . . . . "236 The court concluded that epidemiological 
studies could be offered to prove cause-in-fact in a prob-
abilistic manner. The studies must show, however, that 
exposure to the substance at least doubles the risk of con-
tracting the plaintiffs disease to meet Texas' "more likely 
than not" causation standard.237 Further, the court held 
that a plaintiff must show that he or she is similar to the 
subjects in the studies in terms of the substance involved 
and the dose levels and that other plausible causes of the 
injmy can be excluded with reasonable certainty.238 These 
requirements, according to the court, "strike a balance be-
tween the needs of our legal system and the limits of sci-
ence."239 
The holding in Havner is similar to the conclusions of 
other courts that have examined difficult causation issues, 
particularly in requiring a showing of doubling of risk. 240 
'qlese cases suggest that plaintiffs might be permitted to 
rely on epidemiological studies linking EDCs to health 
problems to support causation, but courts would carefully 
scrutinize the studies for reliability and ensure that the 
studies are relevant to the particular circumstances of the 
234. 953 S.W.2d. at 718. 
235. Id.. at 715. 
236. Id.. at 718. 
237. Id.. at 717-18. 
238. Id.. at 720. 
239. Id.. at 718. 
240. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phann. Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir. 
1995) (on remand), cert. denied, 166 S.Ct. 189 (1996); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow 
Phann., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958 (3d Cir. 1990); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 
947 F.Supp 1387, 1403 (D.Or. 1996). 
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litigation in terms of the exact substance at issue and the 
level of exposure. Animal studies alone are probably not 
su:mcient to support causation, leaving plaintiffs with a 
limited chance of success, as few human epidemiological 
studies have been conducted and as medical ethics would 
bar conducting controlled human studies related to EDCs. 
A potential defendant, such as a chemical manufacturer, 
would have several strong approaches to attack a plaintiffs 
causation arguments, including pointing to conflicting 
studies on the health effects of EDCs or to the presence of 
confounding factors that might be the cause of a plaintiffs 
health problem.241 These factors would include hormonal 
agents, such as birth control pills or phytoestrogen in 
foods, or non-horinonal factors, such as genetics, smoking, 
or exposure to lead or other heavy metals. Confounding 
factors woUld be especially difficult to sort out in EDC liti-
gation because the known health problems associated with 
EDCs are not "signature diseases" that would strongly im-
plicate EDCs as opposed to other agents. In contrast, as-
bestos or DES are both associated with a signature disease 
such as mesothelioma or clear-cell adenocarcinoma. As 
two critics of the chemical industiy have noted regarding 
chances of success in toxic tort suits, "the presence of fin-
gerprints has become far more important than the severity 
of the crime. "242 
Even if a plaintiff could show that synthetic chemicals 
were the cause-in-fact of a health problem, tort law also re-
quires that- the plaintiff identify which particular chemical 
caused the harm. 243 Again, this is a near impossibility be-
cause modern society is permeated by synthetic chemicals. 
United States production of syntheti~ chemicals was over 
435 billion pounds in 1992, or 1,600 pounds per capita,244 
and pesticide use in the United States was over 4.5 billion 
pounds in 1995,245 or about 18 pounds per capita .. As dis-
241. See Kavlock et al .• supra note 1. at 732 (listing confounding factors in en-
docrine disruption). 
242. FAGIN& LAVElLE. supra note 217, at 157. 
243. See Mary Cabrera, Legal Remedies for Victims of Pesticide Exposure, 1 KAN. 
J. L. & PuB. POL 'v 113, 114 (1991) (discussing difficulties of farmworkers in iden-
tifying the specific pesticides to which they have been exposed). 
244. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 137. 
245. Arnold L. Aspelin, U.S. EPA Office of Preventton. Pesticides, and Taxic Sub-
stances, Pesticide Industry Sales and Usage: 1994 and 1995 Market Esttmates. 3 
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cussed above, over fifty types of chemicals are suspected of 
having endocrine-disrupting properties, they have numer-
ous exposure routes, and they act in extremely low doses. 
Many of the suspected EDCs do not even have chemical 
structures similar to the natural hormones they disrupt, 
and the "estrogen receptor system may well be unique ih 
terms of the structural diversity of its effective stimu-
lants. "246 Chemicals such as DDT or PCBs, which have not 
been manufactured in large quantities in over two decades, 
may be important contrtbutors to EDC risks, yet they would 
be very difficult to identify as causal agents because they 
are dispersed throughout the environment and the food-
chain. 
In addition, intervening agents would complicate causa-
tion arguments in an EDC tort suit. EDCs may not act in-
dividually, but rather may act in combination with other 
chemicals, including natural hormones, through synergism, 
inhibition, or potentiation. 247 In sum, the legal hurdles to 
linking a particular health problem to a particular EDC, 
even under less-than-fifty-percent standards of causation, 
appear to be insuperable, at least with the current state of 
scientlflc knowledge. -
Several other problems would hinder both the use of liti-
gation as a response to EDCs and the development of 
regulations restrtcting EDCs. Because society is permeated 
by syrithetic chemicals and because we have all absorbed 
them into body fat to some extent, there is no unexposed 
"control" group to which scientists, attorneys, or regulators 
can compare individuals to argue that differential health 
effects have occurred.248 As stated in Our Stolen Futw-e, 
"[v]irtually anyone willing to put up the $2,000 for the tests 
will find at least 250 chemical contaminants in his or her 
body fat .... "249 The lack of an unexposed control group 
(Aug. 1997) <WWW.epa.gov I oppbead 1 /95pestsales/95pestsales. pdf>. 
246. John A Katzenellenbogen. The Structural Pervasiveness of Estrogenic Ac-
tivity. 103 ENvn.. HEAL111 PERSPEC'IlVES, Supplement 7. 99. 99 (1995). 
247. See Kavlock et al .• supra note 1. at 730. 
248. See id. at 722. 
249. COLBORN ET AL.. supra note 3. at 106. As an example of the lack of an un-
exposed control group. OUR STOLEN FuTuRE describes villagers living above the 
Arctic Circle on Broughton Island, Canada. who have some of the highest body-fat 
PCB concentrations in the world. PCBs from industrialized North America and 
Europe have bioaccumulated in the Arctic foodweb. Id. at 108. 
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does not mean that all the scientific research on EDCs is 
flawed, but only that comparisons in humans are necessar-
ily between those suspected of receiving a higher-than-
average dose and the general population, which has also 
been exposed to some extent. · 
As discussed above, natural hormones and the chemicals 
that disrupt them act in extremely low concentrations in 
the bloodstream, often at the parts-per-billion or even 
parts-per-trillion range.250 These minute dose effects make 
it difficult to develop causation arguments in litigation, as 
well as regulatozy programs within agencies. In addition, if 
many EDCs are found to have the inverted-U-shaped dose-
response curve of DES,251 it might mean that the most 
common categories of plaintiffs in mass toxics cases, such 
as workers exposed to a high dose of a toxic agent in an oc-
cupational setting, might not be the ones suffering the most 
severe effects from EDCs. 252 
A final dose-related issue that will cause problems for 
potential litigation and potential regulation of EDCs is that, 
at least in the case of in utero exposure, the timing of the 
dose appears to be more important than the amount of the 
dose. 253 Fetal development depends on : precisely timed 
doses of hormones. A dose of an estrogenic synthetic 
chemical received by a male fetus during the seventh 
month of gestation may have no effect, for example, 
whereas the same dose received during the first trimester, 
when sexual differentiation occurs, could have a large det-
rimental impact. 254 Because EDCs can be stored in a 
mother's body fat, a fetus may be exposed to EDCs taken 
into the mother's body months or years before her preg-
nancy.255 According to Toppari, "[i]t is therefore not the 
amount ... to which a mother is exposed during pregnancy 
that ls critical, but rather her lifetime exposure that will 
determine the level of exposure of the fetus and the breast-
250. See note 13, supra. 
251. See Part IV(C), supra. 
252. But see Toppart et al., supra note 2, at 758 (MBecause of better documenta-
tion and higher exposure, [occupational) studies are more likely to reveal adverse 
effects of chemicals on humans than are the studies on the general population."). 
253. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 62. 
254. See id. at 46. 
255. See Toppart et al., supra note 2, at 756. 
1999] Legal Responses to Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals 333 
fed infant. "256 Without the ability to pinpoint the timing of 
exposure, proof that a particular exogenous agent caused 
harm to the fetus would be nearly impossible to obtain. 
With diseases that have long latency periods, such as cer-
tain cancers, it would be difficult to determine whether the 
cancer stemmed from an adult exposure to an EDC, expo-
sure to the mother while she was pregnant with the fetus, 
or exposure to the mother before she was pregnant with the 
fetus. 257 
B. Parallels with DES Litigation 
The obstacles to a successful suit over EDCs are formida-
ble under traditional tort doctrine. Over the past two dec-
ades, however, courts have shown some willingness to relax 
traditional tort rules in another context: DES litigation. Be-
cause DES, a synthetic estrogen, is an endocrine disrupting 
chemical with intergenerational effects, it serves as the 
most relevant precedent for potential litigation over EDCs. 
Despite the similarities between DES and EDCs, however, 
the relatively plaintiff-friendly principles enunciated in the 
DES cases are insufficient to provide a solid legal founda-
tion for EDC litigation. Extensive discussions of DES liti-
gation have appeared elsewhere,258 but a few examples of 
the novel theories courts have devised in DES cases are 
useful for explaining why the DES cases do not improve the 
prospects for successful EDC litigation. 
The courts' willingness to relax traditional tort require-
ments in DES cases, such as the requirement that a plain-
tiff identify the specific defendant that caused harm (the 
identification requirement), was a response to the unique 
circumstances of the drug and its effects. DES-daughters 
exposed in utero filed suit against DES manufacturers for 
256. !d. 
257. Furthermore, these problems arlse only after the cancer could be linked to 
an EDC as opposed to some other cause. 
258. The academic literature on DES Is voluminous. See, e.g., Richard Gold-
berg, Causation and Drugs: The Legacy of DiethylstUbestrol, 25 ANGLO-AM L.REv. 
286 (1996); Tracy Batt, Note, DES Third-Generation LiabUity: A Proximate Cause, 
18 CARDozo L. REv. 1217 (1996); David M. Schultz, Market Share UabUity in DES 
Cases: The Unwarranted Erosion of Causation In Fact, 40 DEPAUL L. REv. 771 
(1991); Thomas Currie, Risk Contribution: An Undesirable New Metlwdfor Appor-
tioning Damages in DES Cases, 10 J. CoRP. L. 743 (1985); Glen 0 Robinson, Multi-
ple Causation in Tort Law: Rejlections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REv. 713 (1982). 
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compensation for. adenocarcinoma or other disorders, but 
most DES-daughters could not identify the manufacturer of 
the specific pills their mothers took during pregnancy.259 
Approximately 300 companies manufactured DES, with 
companies continuously entering and leaving the market 
during the three decades in which DES was in widespread 
use.260 
In Sind.ell v. Abbott Laboratories, 261 the California Supreme 
Court resolved the identification problem by employing a 
"market-share liability" doctrine for DES cases. Under this 
doctrine, once a substantial share of all DES manufactur-
ers were joined as defendants and the plaintiff made out a 
successful product liability case, damages would be im-
posed based on the share of the DES market that each de-
fendant possessed, unless a defendant could prove that it 
did not manufacture the particular pills taken by the plain-
tiffs mother.262 Market-share liability shifted the burden of 
proof to defendants to show that they did not cause harm. 
The Sind.eU court reasoned that under this system each 
DES manufacturer's liability over time would approximate 
its responsibility for injuries, 263 and the court also added 
that "as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defen-
dants, the latter should bear the cost of the injury."264 
The doctrine that in certain cases a plaintiff will not be 
required to identify a particular harm-causing defendant 
could indeed be helpful in potential EDC litigation. A 
plaintiff alleging harm from an endocrine disrupting chemi-
cal is similarly unable to identify particular defendants be-
cause the types of EDCs and the mechanisms of exposure 
and injury are so varied. Significantly, the Sind.ell court 
prefaced its outline of the market -share theory with a 
statement advocating judicial activism in response to new 
types of risks: 
259. See, e.g., Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (N.Y. 1989), 
cert denied, 493 u.s. 944 (1989). 
260. Seeid. 
261. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980). 
262. See id. at 936-937. Whether the relevant market should be the national 
market, the California market, or some regional market was not decided in the 
case. This issue spawned years of litigation, and California finally settled on use 
of national market share. See Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1076. 
263. 607 P.2d. at 935. 
264. Id.. at 936. 
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In our contemporary complex society, advances in science 
and technology create fungible goods which may harm con-
sumers and which cannot be traced to any specific producer. 
The response of the courts can be either to adhere rigidly to 
prior doctrine, denying recovery to those injured by such 
products, or to fashion remedies to meet these changing 
needs.265 
This statement is the strongest in DES case law that 
plaintiffs might cite to advocate a relaxation of causation or 
identification requirements in EDC litigation, and it sug-
gests that courts will not be completely inflexible in adapt-
ing tort law to meet new circumstances. 
Some courts, such as the New York Court ofAppeals in 
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 266 followed the SindeU market 
share theory. Others rejected it and have continued to de-
mand that plaintiffs identify the manufacturer of the par-
ticular DES pills the plaintiffs mother ingested.267 Often 
these courts are hesitant to make major changes in tort 
law, such as market-share liability, because they believe 
such changes should be implemented by legislatures, not 
courts. 268 Some courts have implemented other types of 
burden-shifting mechanisms, such as alternative liabj)ity, 
in DES cases.269 Signtllcantly, federal courts hearing DES 
cases have been reluctant to devise novel theories of tort li-
ability because federal courts defer to state judges on the 
evolution of state tort law. 270 Therefore, potential EDC 
plaintiffs are likely to find state courts to be a more favor-
able forum. 
Although many courts in DES cases have relaxed tradi-
tional tort requirements in response to suits by sympathetic 
plaintiffs who could not identify the defendant that caused 
265. Id. 
266. 539 N.E.2d 1069. (N.Y. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989). 
267. See, e.g .• Morton v. Abbott Lab .• 538 F.Supp. 593 (M.D.Fla. 1982); Payton 
v. Abbott Lab .• 512 F.Supp. 1031 (D.Mass. 1981). 
268. SeeMulcahyv. Eli Lilly & Co, 386 N.W.2d 67, 75-76 (Iowa 1986). 
269. Under alternative liability, DES manufacturers who could not exculpate 
themselves were subject to joint and several liability .. See Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
289 N.W.2d 20 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979), Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 420 A.2d 1305 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980). 
270. See Thomas J. Currie, Risk Contribution: An Undesirable New Method for 
ApportiDntng Damages in the DES Cases, 10 J. CoRP. L. 743, 747 (1985). 
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their harm, the importance of the DES cases as precedent 
for future lawsuits involving EDCs should not be over-
stated. Most importantly, it should be noted that the tradi-
tional tort law requirement that was relaxed in Sindell and 
other DES cases was the requirement of showing which 
specific manufacturer caused the harm. The requirement of 
proving that DES caused the harm, as opposed to some 
other factor, was not relaxed.271 This latter requirement was 
a surmountable hurdle in the DES litigation, despite long 
latency periods, because most plaintiffs were able to prove 
that their mothers ingested DES and because the plaintiffs 
had signature diseases, such as adenocarcinoma, that were 
strongly linked to in utero exposure to DES. DES was a pill, 
and the exposure route was clear. 
In contrast. dozens of compounds are suspected of being 
EDCs. EDCs permeate the environment, and exposure can 
occur through many· different pathways. Even if a plaintiff 
could show that an EDC, as opposed to some other envi-
ronmental agent or genetics, caused his or her health 
problem (whether through in utero or direct exposure), the 
plaintiff in the vast majority of cases will not know which 
particular endocrine disrupting agent caused the harm. It 
is only when a plaintiff gets past that hurdle that the DES 
cases would be useful precedents. 272 At that point, it would 
be appropriate for courts to follow the DES precedents and 
relax the requirement that the plaintiff show which par-
ticular company manufactured the EDC that was shown to 
have caused the injury. 273 
One could imagine a system in which the identification 
271. Further, the requirement of showing that DES was a defective product was 
not relaxed. Plaintiffs still had to proceed under negligence or strict liability theo-
ries. In the latter case, plaintiffs had to show that the product was unreasonably 
dangerous. See, e.g., Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 51 (Wis. 1984). 
272. Although proving causation would be harder for EDCs than for DES be-
cause of the large variety of EDCs and exposure pathways, identifying defendants 
might be easier in EDC cases once a specific EDC could be shown to have caused 
the injury. This is because there might be only a handful of manufacturers of a 
given EDC, such as a pesticide, whereas there were approximately three hundred 
manufacturers of DES. Indeed, eighty percent of the world pesticide industry is 
controlled by only twenty companies. See JOHN WARGO, OUR CHILDREN'S TOXIC 
LEGACY- HOW SciENCE AND lAW FAIL TO PROTECT Us FROM PES11CIDES 3 (1996). 
273. See Cabrera, supra note 243, at 118 ("Market share liability may be appro-
priate in cases of pesticide exposure when the victims can identify the specific 
product responsible for their injuries."). 
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requirement could be relaxed (and the burden of proof 
shifted to defendants) at an even lower threshold of proof by 
the plaintiff. For example, a rule might be devised so that 
once a plaintiff has demonstrated that a synthetic EDC 
caused his or her injury, all manufacturers of all EDCs 
would be held liable on a market-share or other basis un-
less they could demonstrate that they did not cause the 
harm. 274 This is probably the only legal rule that would give 
plaintiffs in EDC suits any hope of success, but such a rule 
would stretch tort doctrine to the point of absurdity and 
would impose unfair burdens on defendants, as the entire 
chemical industry could be roped into almost every poten-
tial EDC case. 
It should be noted that courts in cases such as Hymowitz 
and Sindell, recognizing the departure they were making 
from traditional tort doctrine, attempted to limit the scope 
of the novel theories they enunciated. The New York Court 
of Appeals in Hymowitz, for example, stressed that "the 
DES situation is a singular case, with manufacturers acting 
in a parallel manner to produce an identical, generically 
marketed product, which causes injury many years · 
later .... "275 The California Supreme Court in SindeU simi-
larly stressed that a crucial factor in its decision was that 
DES was a fungible product.276 If all manufacturers of a 
274. See generally Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Igrwrance in the Manufacture of 
Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 773 (1997) (advocates shifting the burden of 
proof on causation in taxies cases because chemical manufacturers have better 
access to information about the risks of their products). 
275. 539 N.E.2d at 1075. 
276. 607 P.2d at 936. One commentator suggests that there is no reason to 
limit the principles of Sindell to fungible products. See Glen 0. Robinson, Multiple 
Causation in Tort Law: Rejlecttons on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REv. 713 (1982). 
Robinson argues that liability could be imposed based on percentage contribution 
to the injury in any case in which several factors contributed to a harm. "As long 
as liability is proportionate to the risks created by a defendant, • he asserts, "there 
Is no reason why the Sindell liability rule cannot be applied to cases involving 
multiple and different risk-creating activities. • Id. at 750. He adds that "there Is 
no reason even to require that all of the causal agents be identified, so long as It 
can be proved what contribution a given defendant made to the risk. • Id. at 753. 
Robinson's theory could potentially be useful in EDC litigation, as an EDC may be 
one of many factors that contribute to a health or reproductive disorder. But 
Robinson Is too optimistic about the ability of courts and juries to determine the 
percentages by which various factors contribute to a harm, especially when all 
defendants are not before the court. No court has adopted Robinson's theory 
since it was first outlined in 1982. 
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certain product can be brought trito a case, these courts 
reasoned, there must be a showing that all defendants 
contributed equally to the risk through manufacturing an 
identical, fungible product. EDCs are far from fungible, 
however. They exist in a huge variety of chemical forms 
and concentrations in diverse products. Courts have gen-
erally declined to extend market -share liability to products 
other than DES, such as asbestos (where the forms of as-
bestos and types of exposure varted), 277 and they would 
probably be similarly hesitant to extend the market-share 
doctrine to EDCs. 
The differences between EDCs and DES highlight a fun-
damental principle of toxic tort litigation: litigation will be 
most successful when the toxic substance is potent, associ-
ated with a signature disease, and emitted in a concen-
trated fashion from one or a small number of sources. It 
will be least successful in cases such as EDCs where the 
pollution is not highly toxic, is dispersed from a large num-
ber of sources, and does not cause a signature disease. 278 
Plaintiffs' lawyers are likely to take the former type of case 
because causal links will be easier to draw, whereas injured 
individuals will have difficulty finding legal representation 
for the latter type of case279 even if the overall health risks 
from the dispersed pollution are larger. In short, "some en-
vironmental injury paradigms lend themselves to institu-
tional responses such as tort litigation that are inappropri-
ate or inapplicable for other paradigms. "280 
C. Other Legal Parallels for EDC Utigation 
There have been few non-DES cases in the United States 
in which plaintiffs have claimed loss of fertility or harm to 
reproductive organs. Most of these cases involve medical 
277. See Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691 (Ohio 1987) 
(declines to apply market share theo:ry because asbestos products not fungible); 
Case v. Fibreboard Corp., 743 P.2d 1062 (Okla. 1987) (same); Setliffv. E.I.Dupont 
de Nemours & Co .• 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 763 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (declines to apply 
market share theo:ry because products containing volatlle organic compounds are 
not fungible). 
278. See Troyen A Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 VAND. L. REv. 1. 18 (1993). 
279. See id. at 18-19. 
280. ld. at 18. 
1999) Legal Responses to Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals 339 
malpractice281 or defective intra-uterine devices (IUD's),282 
not exposure to environmental toxins. 
One body of case law that might be relevant to potential 
EDC litigation is the so-called "pre-conception torts." In 
these suits, a plaintiff claims that the defendant caused 
injury to the plaintiffs mother prior to the conception of the 
plaintiff83 and that the injury resulted in a birth defect or 
other health problem in the plaintiff.284 For example, the Il-
linois Supreme Court allowed a child to proceed with a suit 
where the child's mother had been negligently sensitized to 
Rh positive blood at the age of thirteen, allegedly resulting 
in the premature birth eight years later of the child, who 
was brain damaged and needed frequent transfusions. 285 In 
contrast, a New York court, concerned that liability be kept 
within manageable bounds, barred a plaintiff from asserting 
a claim for birth defects resulting from the negligent perfo-
ration of his mother's uterus during an earlier abortion. 286 
The New York court distinguished pre-conception torts from 
torts against existing fetuses, which are cognizable claims 
in New York, stating that in existing fetus cases "there are 
two identifiable beings in the zone of danger each of whom 
is owed a duty independent of the other and each of whom 
may be directly injured. "287 
The pre-conception tort cases are relevant to any potential 
EDC litigation because, as discussed above, mothers may 
be exposed to EDCs years before conception and may store 
the chemicals in body fat, then damaging a ·fetus in utero. 288 
A question thus arises of when the tort occurred. Was it 
when the mother was exposed to the EDC, or when the 
EDCs seeped from her body into her child's? Which "be-
281. See, e.g., Battenfeld v. Gregory, 589 A.2d 1059 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Dtv. 
1991) (plaintiffs allege that delay in removing ruptured appendix during preg-
nancy damaged uterus). 
282. See, e.g., Mackereth v. G.D. Searle & Co., 674 N.E.2d 936 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1996); King v. Searle Pharm., Inc., 832 P.2d 858 (Utah 1992). 
283. These are thus distinguished from the DES cases, where the claim is that 
the plaintiff was harmed in utero. 
284. See Batt, supra note 61, at 1235-1240, for a discussion of preconception 
torts. 
285. Renslowv. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250 (Ill. 1977). 
286. Albala v. City of New York, 429 N.E.2d 786 (N.Y. 1981). 
287. Id. at 787. 
288. See text accompanying note 255, supra. 
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ings" are in the zone of danger, and at what times? 
Apart from the DES cases, the case that is most factually 
analogous to potential EDC litigation and that most closely 
demonstrates the challenges that a potential EDC plaintiff 
might confront is Sanderson v. Intl. Flavors & Fragrances, 
Inc. 289 In Sanderson, the plaintiff sued several fragrance 
manufacturers, claiming that their products caused sinus 
inflammation, toxic encelopathy (brain damage). dysosmia 
(deranged sense of smell), and "multiple chemical sensitiv-
ity."290 The plaintiff claimed th.at she was .exposed to fra-
grance products on over 16,000 occasions between April 
1994 and October 1995, but for 70 percent of those occa-
sions she was unable to identify the fragrance products to 
which she was exposed.291 Her claim was somewhat out-
landish, and was treated as such by the court, but her 
problem of identifying harmful agents after long-term expo-
sure to a profusion of chemicals is similar to that which a 
potential plaintiff would face in bringing a suit over EDCs. 
The court granted the defendant's motion for summruy 
judgment because although a "jury could probably find that 
defendants' products, as a whole, were a substantial factor 
in causing her injuries, plaintiff has no evidence whatever 
from which a jury could find that any particular defendant's 
products were."292 As discussed above, this is a likely 
holding in potential EDC litigation as well, where EDCs in 
general might be shown to have caused a harm, but not a 
particular kind or brand of EDC. The court also rejected 
the plaintiffs suggestion that she could meet her causation 
burden by showing merely that her injuries were the type 
caused by the fragrances, that she was exposed to the fra-
grances. and that there was some temporal connection be-
tween the exposure and harm.293 "At best," the court ex-
plained, this "establishes only a 'mere possibility' that 
defendants' fragrance products were the ones that caused 
her injuries, and even less of a possibility that any one de-
fendant's products caused them."294 The Sanderson court 
289. 950 F.Supp. 981 (C.D.Cal. 1996). 
290. Id. at 986. 
291. !d. 
292. !d. at 985. 
293. Id. at 988. 
294. !d. 
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concluded that the "[p]laintiffs only hope of meeting her 
causation burden lies in shifting it to defendants," but then 
proceeded to rejecf her arguments for imposing market 
share or alternative liability.295 The request for burden-
shifting and market share liability, and the rejection of 
those requests, are also likely scenarios in potential EDC 
litigation. 
Finally, the case is telling because the plaintiffs argu-
ments rested on meager scientific evidence and involved a 
new purported disease, "multiple chemical sensitivity," on 
which little research had been conducted. Perhaps recog-
nizing her slim chance of establishing causation, the plain-
tiff implored in a pre-trial motion: "Given the dearth of re-
search on the neurotoxic effects of fragrances and fragrance 
chemicals, what is a plaintiff to do?"296 The court responded 
sardonically in its opinion: 'Wait. When a plaintiff can't 
prove her case with reliable scientific evidence, she can't 
prove her case."297 
Fragrances and EDCs both fall into the same category of 
diffuse exposures, non-signature diseases, and subtle ef-
fects. While the scientific evidence linking exposure to 
harm is stronger for EDCs than for fragrances, Sanderson 
suggests that the prospects for successful EDC litigation, 
resting on similar facts of wide exposure to chemicals, in-
ability to identify defendants, and controversial scientific 
linkages, are limited. Sanderson also suggests that the 
courts will not allow plaintiffs to proceed without substan-
tial evidence of causation even where the courts recognize 
that such evidence will be difficult, if not impossible, to 
obtain. 
D. Drawbacks of Utigation for Addressing EDC Risks 
Despite the current practical difficulties with bringing an 
EDC tort suit, a central normative question is whether the 
legal system should encourage tort suits over EDCs as a 
295. Id. at 989-992. The court stated that the plaintiff was not entitled to use 
the alternative liability doctrine because she had not joined all potential tortfea-
sors. She was not entitled to use the market-share liability doctrine because the 
products were not fungible and because she had failed to join a substantial share 
of the market. Id. 
296. Id. at 1003. 
297. Id. 
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means to compensate injured individuals, force EDC 
manufacturers to internalize their costs, and fill potential 
gaps in regulation of EDCs. Should courts be as hesitant 
as they currently appear to be regarding relaxing causation 
and identification requirements in non-DES cases? Should 
they be more willing to shift the burden of proof to manu-
facturers of suspected toxic chemicals to show that their 
products did not cause harm? 
If the effects of EDCs are subtle and causation is hard to 
prove, proponents of less stringent tort laws might argue, 
the legal system should adapt to those scientific realities 
rather than block the courthouse door to injured parties. 
Indeed, some analysts have made this type of argument in 
calling for a plaintiff-favorable response from the legal sys-
tem to the dangers posed by EDCs. Mruy O'Brian, a toxics 
and risk assessment specialist, asserts that "the legal 
framework must reflect, rather than deny, scientific reality 
regarding toxic chemicals"298 and that "litigation must crea-
tively challenge the existing· tension between our legal 
framework for toxics use and science. "299 Other scholars 
have called for burden-shifting to defendants in toxic tort 
cases. Wendy Wagner of Case Western Law School argues 
that when lack of causation evidence results from the 
manufacturer's failure to test a product, rather than from 
inherent limits of scientific inquiry, the plaintiff should be 
entitled to a rebuttable presumption of causation. 300 
Instituting major changes in tort law for EDC cases is 
unwise, however, on several grounds. If legal rules were 
relaxed so that a plaintiff did not have to eliminate con-
founding factors or identify the specific EDC that caused 
harm, large damage awards might result. Consequently, 
manufacturers ,may be overdeterred and beneficial chemi-
cals might be withdrawn from·the market without a demon-
stration that they caused any harm. While burden-shift:fug 
298. O'Brtan, supra note 6, at 332 
299. Id. 
300. Wagner, supra note 274, at 834-836. Wagner draws a useful distinction 
between inherent scientific uncertainties, which she calls ~trans-science, • and sci-
entitle uncertainties that could have been resolved by manufacturer testing. But 
her argument would allow a plaintiff to sue almost any manufacturer of any toxic 
chemical if the plaintiff could not identify the cause of her harm, with the burden 
of proof shifting to those defendants whom the court determines have not ade-
quately tested their product. 
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may be appropriate if the plaintiff can identify the specific 
chemical that caused a health problem (paralleling the DES 
cases), plaintiffs should not be allowed to sue all or nearly 
all chemical manufacturers, and shift the burden of proof to 
them, on the mere assertion that EDCs p:1. general probably 
caused a harm. 
Studies linking EDCs to health and reproductive disor-
ders in animals and humans are cause for concern, but it 
does not necessarily follow that we should tum to the 
courts to fashion a remedy. Litigation is not the answer to 
every toxic risk. There is a fundamental unfairness inher-
ent in imposing liability without a strong showing of causa-
tion, and arguments for deterrence, risk-spreading, or novel 
theories of liability should come into play only once that 
showing is made. As the California district court held in 
Sanderson: 
Courts are ill-equipped to conduct trials of entire industries, 
and individual plaintiffs in a private action have no right to 
put entire industries on trial. Private cases and controversies 
must sweep more narrowly, catching within the litigation net 
only those persons whom the plaintiff can link to the harm 
that has befallen her. That application of these principles 
may leave an injured person without a remedy in tort is no 
objection, because the tort system is not designed to provide 
, fi ~I compensation or every injury .. 
Compared to litigation, regulatory responses better ad-
dress diffuse dangers from innumerable chemicals in the 
environment (though regulations admittedly do not com-
pensate harmed individuals). They can be implemented 
based on scientific data that a chemical may be harmful to 
the human population, whereas litigation depends on much 
more substantial proof that a product actually caused harm 
to a specific individual. 302 Furthermore, EDCs are similar to 
301. 950 F.Supp. at 1003. 
302. Regulatory measures could be based on an1mal tests of EDCs, whereas 
toxic tort litigation often is not successful unW statistically-stgntflcant evidence of 
a danger to the human population has been collected. In the asbestos context, for 
example, the need for such evidence meant that litigation was not successful unW 
decades after risks from asbestos were first identified, with dangerous exposures 
occurring in the meantime. See Wendy E. Wagner, Note, nuns-sctence fn Torts. 
96 YAIEL. J. 428,428 (1986). 
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other substances, such as air or water pollutants, to which 
the legal system has responded mainly through regulation 
rather than litigation: the effects of EDCs are subtle, there 
is a myriad of manufacturers and exposure pathways, and 
the entire population is continually exposed to small 
amounts of EDCs through diet and environmental agents. 
Because EDCs cross state and even international bounda-
ries, national regulation, rather than a patchwork of state 
tort laws, is the more appropriate legal response. Although 
regulatory standard-setting is by no means perfect,303 regu-
latory measures could address EDC risks in a more tar-
geted manner than is within the capabilities of the courts. 
Litigation over EDCs, on the other hand, could result in 
scattershot tort damages in which the most serious EDC 
risks might not be addressed because they may be harder 
to link to concrete injuries. Litigation would be an ex post 
approach to the EDC problem because it involves claims for 
compensation for harm that has already occurred. To be 
sure, damage awards can also deter manufacturers in a 
prospective fashion, but it might take decades of litigation, 
proceeding chemical by chemical, before public health is 
protected to any measurable extent. 
While regulation appears to be the preferable route for re-
sponding to EDC risks, it would be most effective if Con-
gress acted to reform key aspects of our toxics regulatory 
system. Existing statutes are blunt instruments, and Con-
gress should provide the EPA with better statutory tools if 
the agency is to address what could be a significant new 
type of toxic risk. 
VI. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
It is beyond the scope of this article to outline compre-
hensively a new statutory /regulatory regime for EDCs. De-
signing a new regulatory architecture for EDCs is perhaps 
premature given the recent nature of the science. To some 
extent, creating a better system for responding to EDC risks 
would entail overhauling the way all toxic chemicals are 
regulated, as EDCs would probably be regulated under the 
303. See infra Part IV for a discussion of problems in regulation of toxic chemi-
cals. 
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same statutes as other toxics. Other analysts have ad-
dressed the issue of reforming toxics regulation in gen-
eral, 304 and the information that is coming to light about 
EDCs provides one more argument for revisiting the fun-
damental assumptions and bases of U.S. toxics policy. 
Ideas for new legal responses to EDCs are likely to progress 
as the scientiflc research progresses, but some general sug-
gestions may be proposed even at this stage. 
A. Prospects for Congressional Action 
To avoid the limitations discussed previously related to 
rule-making under existing statutes, congressional action 
would be necessary. The prospects for further congres-
sional involvement in the EDC issue are uncertain, how-
ever. On the one hand, Congress moved swiftly (within four 
months of the publicity related to Our Stolen Future) to 
mandate the endocrine disruptor screening programs in the 
FQPA and the SDWA amendments of 1996. On the other 
hand, these provisions were research-oriented and did not 
provide the EPA with new regulatory authority. Some of the 
congressional proponents of further endocrine disruptor re-
search cited concerns about increasing rates of breast can-
cer in their states,305 and especially if endocrine disruption 
is viewed as a women's and children's health issue, it could 
rise once again on the legislative agenda. 
If Congress were to act, one positive approach would be to 
use the data from the screening and testing efforts that will 
occur over the next few years to legislate restrictions on 
those EDCs deemed to be most hazardous. In the few cases 
where there have been major additions to lists of regulated 
toxic substances, they have occurred through congressional 
action, not agency rule-making procedures. In 1984 
304. See, e.g .• Dernbach, supra note 144. See also Carl B. Meyer, The Environ-
mental Fate of Toxic Waters, the Certainty of Harm. Toxic Torts, and Toxic Regula-
tion, 19 ENvn.. L. 321 (1988). 
305. See 141 Cong.Rec. S17749-S17752 (daily ed. November 29, 1995) (dia-
logue between Senator Moynihan (D-NY) and Senator D'Amato (R-NY) on endo-
crine disruption, with mention of elevated breast cancer rates on Long Island). 
These two Senators were joined by an influential House Democrat. Heruy Waxman 
(D-CA). in supporting endocrine disruptor research. See 142 Cong. Rec. H10960 
(daily ed. September 24, 1996) (Waxman explaining support for the Estrogenic 
Substances Screening Program in FQPA and SDWA Amendments). 
346 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 24:289 
amendments306 to the Resource Recovery and Conservation 
Act (RCRA),307 for example, Congress directed the EPA to 
change its testing procedure for toxicity, leading to the ad-
dition of twenty-five toxins to the list of fourteen that were 
already regulated under RCRA. 308 In the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments, Congress directed the EPA to develop a 
broader regulatory program for hazardous air pollutants 
and listed 1n the statute the 189 pollutants to be regu-
lated. 309 If Congress were to develop a statuto:ry list of the 
most hazardous EDCs, with accompanying restrictions, it 
would speed the process of protecting against EDC risks. 
B. Right -to-Know Provisions 
The EDSTAC has re.commended a broad public outreach 
strategy as the screening and testing program for EDCs 
proceeds. 310 . This program includes public notification of 
the testing process and test results, public input into 
nominating chemicals for screening, and information re-
leases tailored to specific groups, such as farm workers and 
environmental justice organizations, who may be particu-
larly affected by EPA decisions.311 Public notification and 
pro.cedural openness are essential to develop support 
among various stakeholders for the screening and testing 
program. 
More broadly, Congress and the EPA should consider 
listing endocrine disruptors under the Toxic Release In-
ventory (TRI) of the Emergency Planning and Community 
~ght-to-Know_ Act (EPCRA).312 The TRI, which is compiled 
306. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 99 Stat. 
3221 (1984). 
307. 42 u.s.c. §§ 6901-6992k (1995) .. 
308. See David Montgomery Moore, The Toxicity Characteristic Rule for Hazard-
ous Waste Determination: Has EPA Satisfied Congress' Mandate?, 7 TUL. ENvrL. 
L.J. 467, 468 (1994). The change to EPA's toxicity testing procedure is at 42 
u.s.c. § 6921(g) (1994). 
309. 42 u.s.c. § 7412(b)(l) (1994). 
310. EDSTAC REPORr, supra note 10, at 7-19. 
311. !d. 
312. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1995). The TRI is outlined in the Act at §§ 
11022-11023. In a single rule-making, EPA was recently able to add 286 chemi-
cals to the list of chemicals required to be reported under the TRI. See 40 C.F.R 
pt. 372. The relative ease by which so many chemicals were added at one time 
may be attrtbuted· to the fact that the TRI is a reporting statute and does not im-
pose any restrictions on chemical releases. A challenge to this rule-making was 
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from mandatory submissions of industry data, is the major 
database of pollutants released by U.S. industry each year. 
There is an emerging network of environmental, environ-
mental justice, and public health groups focusing on endo-
crine disruption,313 so intermediaries might be available to 
interpret TRI information and to call media attention to 
large releases of EDCs. Since the TRI covers only point-
source discharges, however, its usefulness for detailing 
EDC risks might be limited. 
California's Proposition 65 is a "right-to-know" law that 
could be even more effective against EDCs. Passed in 1986, 
it bars the discharge into drinking water of any chemical 
known to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity and requires 
warnings before exposing individuals to such chemicals 
through non-drinking water routes.314 The California EPA 
has compiled a list of chemicals subject to the law, many of 
which are suspected EDCs,315 and a combination of state 
investigation of reproductive toxicity through endocrine dis-
ruption and private citizen suits to enforce the law could be 
effective in addressing many EDC risks in California. 
Proposition 65 involves burden-shifting. Under the law, 
dischargers of chemicals must show that the chemical 
poses "no significant risk" of human disease in order to 
avoid the warning requirement.316 In contrast to its usual 
recalcitrance, industry has supported the California EPA's 
promulgation of standards for "no significant risk" because 
such standards provide bright -line rules for whether a 
warning is required.317 Furthermore, there is strong evi-
rejected by a district court. See Nafl Oilseed Processors Ass'n. v. Browner, 924 
F.Supp. 1193 (D.D.C. 1996). 
313. See KEYsToNE CENTER, CONVENING REPORr REGARDING TilE FORMATION OF TilE 
ENDOCRINE DISRUPI'OR SCREENING AND TEsnNG ADVISORY COMMITTEE (Oct. 1996) 
<www.epa.govjopptintr/opptendo/keystone.htm>. 
314. Cal. Health & Safety Code§§ 25249.5-25249.6. (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). 
315. OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTII HAzARD AsSESSMENT, CAUFORNIA 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTION AGENCY, CHEMICALS KNOWN TO TilE STATE TO CAUSE 
CANCER OR REPRODUCTIVE TOXICI1Y, (May 15, 1998) <WWW.oehha.org/prop65/cas 
1598.htm> (listing suspected EDCs such as heptachlor, chlordane, DDT, DDE, 
and dieldrin). 
316. CAL. HEALTII & SAFElY CODE§ 25249.10(c) (West 1992 & Supp. 1999). 
317. According to David Roe, co-author of the initiative, "California managed to 
draw bright lines for more chemicals in the first twelve months of the Proposition 
65 era than the federal government has managed to accomplish, under the sup-
posedly omnibus Toxic Substances Control Act, in the previous twelve years.· 
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dence that a major effect of Proposition 65 has been to 
prompt companies to reformulate products containing haz-
ardous chemicals in order to avoid the warnings about can-
cer or reproductive toxicity.318 Because such product refor-
mulations have occurred on a nation-wide scale, not just 
for California, 319 this state "right to know" law has had a 
positive substantive impact across the country. A national 
toxics law modeled on Proposition 65 that involves burden-
shifting could achieve similar results on a larger scale and 
may be effective in responding to EDC risks. 
C. Burden-Shifting under TSCA 
A related step that could be taken at the federal level to 
respond to EDC and other tQxic risks is amending TSCA to 
shift the burden of proof to chemical manufacturers to 
demonstrate the safety of chemicals.32° Currently, the bur-
den is on the EPA to identify synthetic chemicals that are 
likely to present an "unreasonable risk," to require testing, 
and, relying on data submitted by the manufacturer, to 
make the decision on whether to restrict the chemical. 
Each step in this process is cumbersome and subject to 
delay, and in the meantime chemicals may be freely sold 
and distributed. This has led to a situation in which few 
chemicals are required to be tested and in which no toxicity 
information is available for 78% of the 12,860 chemicals 
that are used in quantities exceeding one million pounds 
per year.321 
The placement of the burden of proof under TSCA is in-
consistent with other statutes. Under FIFRA, for example, 
the burden is on manufacturers to demonstrate the safety 
David Roe, An Incentive-Conscious Approach to Toxtc Chemical Controls, 3 EcON. 
DEV. Q. 179, 181 (1989). 
318. See CUfford Rechtschaffen, The Warning Game: Evaluating Warnings Under 
California's Proposition 65, 23 EcOLOGYL.Q. 303,341-348 (1996). 
319. See id. at 341. 
320. Manufacturers are required to submit a Pre-Manufacture Notlftcatlon 
(MPMN•J for new chemicals, but they are not required to develop toxicity data prior 
to doing so. See EDSTAC REPORI', supra note 10, at 2-9. The EDSTAC states that 
in reviewing a notlftcatlon for a new chemical, the EPA can use rtsk assessment 
models to predict likely toxic effects of the chemical, but the EDSTAC also ac-
knowledges that the EPA Moften drops review and gives approval for most chemi-
cals.· Id. 
321. See Dembach, supra note 144, at 28. 
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of pesticides prior to receiving a registration from the 
EPA.322 Under the FDCA, drug manufacturers must obtain 
Food and Drug Administration approval prior to marketing 
new drugs.323 Simllarly, before a manufacturer is permitted 
to expose thousands or millions of people (many involun-
tarily) to chemicals whose connection to a health problem 
might be difficult to prove in an ex post tort suit, the 
manufacturer should be required by law to demonstrate the 
safety to the chemical to the EPA. 
To be sure, every manufacturer of a risk-producing prod-
uct should not be required to obtain governmental approval 
prior to sale. Chemicals can be distinguished, however, 
from products such as power tools, sporting goods, or in-
dustrial equipment - products which carry some risks but 
which normally do not require governmental approval. In-
dividuals do not necessarily know that they have been ex-
posed to chemicals, for example, and chemical manufactur-
ers can generally escape liability for harm because of 
difficult causation issues.324 Tort suits alone provide an in-
sufficient incentive for manufacturers to develop toxicity 
information because it is precisely the lack of such infor-
mation that may force dismissal of a suit on the grounds of 
lack of causation evidence. 325 Requiring the development of 
toxicity information before sale would go a long way toward 
redressing the imprudence of current regulatory ap-
proaches to toxic chemicals. 
322. Because the burden of producing safety information is on manufacturers 
under FIFRA. the EPA has much more data on the hazards of a relatively small 
number of pesticides than it has on the thousands of industrial chemicals pro-
duced in much larger quantities (which are regulated under TSCA). See EDSTAC 
REPORT, supra note 10, at 7-16. 
323. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1998). As part of the pre-market approval process, ap-
plicants must submit reports •to show whether or not such drug is safe for use 
and whether such drug is effective in use." Id.. at § 355(b). This is exactly the type 
of information that should be required of chemical manufacturers under TSCA. 
324. As Troyen Brennan put it, in most mass product liability cases ·the plain-
tiffs worked with, or bought, the product. . . . Each plaintiff has encountered the 
product in a manner that can be documented. The same documentation is not 
possible in environmental torts unless the pollution leaves a residue." Brennan, 
supra note 278, at 46. 
325. See Wagner, supra note 274, at 774-776. While a ·duty-to-test" exists at 
common law, most courts use it as a means to impose liability once a plaintiff has 
shown that a product caused his or her harm. lf the plaintiff cannot make the 
initial showing of causation, however, there is usually no •duty-to-test" liability. 
Id.. at 803-805. 
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Although they have not outlined their proposals in detail, 
several endocrine disruption researchers have proposed 
shifting the burden of proof about chemical risks to chemi-
cal manufacturers. The authors of Our Stolen Future argue 
that "emerging evidence about hormonally active chemicals 
should be used to identify those posing the greatest risk 
and to force them off the market and out of our food and 
water until studies can prove their impact to be trivial. "326 
Mary O'Brian states flatly that "[u)se of chemicals should be 
suspect. "327 She adds that "[s]ociety must end the failed 
process of estlniating how much of each toxic chemical the 
world can stand, and orient legislation and litigation 
around the feasible process of determining how little toxic 
chemical use is necessary. "326 
Under a fair burden-shifting plan, Congress should re-
quire that toxicity information for all chemicals be submit-
ted to the EPA by a specified date, with a prohibition. upon 
manufacture or sale as the penalty for non-compliance. 
Though it would be politically more difficult, Congress could 
also prohibit manufacture or sale after a certain date un-
less EPA reviews the toxicity information and gives approval 
to the chemical_ as riot posing an "unreasonable risk" to 
human health. Congress would need to provide the EPA 
with additional resources to sort through the submitted 
data efficiently and to make scientifically sound determina-
tions on thousands of chemicals. Of course, EPA determi-
nations on whether a chemical could be manufactured or 
sold based on the submitted data could still be challenged 
in court, but at least manufacturers would have less incen-
tive to delay. 
As discussed in Part V of this article, courts should be 
reluctant to shift the burden of proof onto defendants in 
potential EDC lawsuits. Such burden-shifting would per-
mit plaintiffs to sue dozens of chemical manufacturers and 
force them to prove that they did not cause the plaintiffs 
health or reproductive disorder. Burden-shifting in the 
regulatory context, in contrast, would require only that 
manufacturers demonstrate that a product will not cause 
326. COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 219. 
327. O'Brian, supra note 6, at 354. 
328. Id. at 358. 
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significant harm to the human population. This is much 
less onerous than repeatedly requiring companies to dis-
prove their link to injuries of specific individuals. 
On October 9, 1998, the Chemical Manufacturers Asso-
ciation (CMA), the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), and 
the Clinton Administration announced a six-year program 
to test the health and environmental effects of 2,800 chemi-
cals produced in excess of 1 million pounds per year. 329 The 
program, which implements many of the recommendations 
of EDF's 1997 study, Toxic Ignorance, is expected to cost 
the chemical industry $500-$700 million. 330 The program is 
additional to the 15,000 chemicals that will be screened for 
endocrine disrupting effects under the EDSTAC recommen-
dations.331 That the chemical industry is undertaking vol-
untary testing for product safety (albeit under the threat of 
EPA-ordered tests)332 is a very positive ~tep. It will be a 
change from past industry practices of claiming that chemi-
cals are safe without conducting safety research. The test-
ing program has a number of safeguards to ensure that the 
testing will be unbiased and that the results will be trans-
parent. 333 Voluntary testing should not replace reforming 
TSCA, however, anq eventually, testing should be expanded 
to include lower production volume chemicals, so that the 
burden of proof on chemical safety becomes fully shifted to 
the cheinical industry. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The emerging research into EDCs has raised disturbing 
warnings about new kinds of health risks from chemicals. 
The data on falling sperm counts and other fertility prob-
lems, the DES experience, and reproductive disorders in 
animals exposed to suspected EDCs all ~uggest that there 
329. "Industry to Test 2,800 Major Chemicals for Health, Environmental Ef-
fects," EDF News Release, October 9, 1998 c:www.edf.org/pubs/newsreleases/ 
1998/oct/b%5Fcma.html> (hereinafter EDF News Release). 
330. Id. 
331. See Claudia H. Deutsch, Chemical Industry to Spend $1 BUlion to Assess 
Product Safety, N.Y. 'nMEs, January 27, 1999, atA14. 
332: See EDF News Release, supra note 329. Chemical manufacturers will have 
13 months to volunteer their products for testing, after which EPA will mandate 
testing through a TSCA test rule. See id. · 
333. Id. See also Deutsch, supra note 331. 
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may be real risks to the human population through endo-
crine disruption. That these risks are not yet well-defined 
does not mean that they should be ignored. The suscepti-
bility of fetuses to endocrine disruption, the potential im-
pact on human reproduction, and the fact that EDCs per-
meate the environment, all warrant caution in the face of 
uncertain risks. Endocrine disruption must be taken seri-
ously as a public health issue. 
While there is considerable scientific controversy sur-
rounding EDCs, it is clear that EDCs do not fit neatly into 
traditional scientific and legal approaches to toxic chemi-
cals. EDC characteristics such as low-dose effects, numer-
ous exposure routes, and intergenerational impacts make 
risk assessment difficult. Consequently, crafting any type 
of legal response to EDCs will be extraordinarily problem-
atic. Indeed, the current state of scientific knowledge re-
garding EDCs is probably too rudimentary to support legal 
action. 
Because there are so many obstacles to fashioning a re-
sponse to EDCs, however, the legal and regulatory commu-
nities should closely follow the scientific research and begin 
to consider the legal tools that may be applied as the scien-
tific evidence grows stronger. More research into EDC risks 
is necessary, but legal analysts should not be excluded 
from the scientific and policy discourse because of the in-
fancy of the research, nor because of an ill-advised desire to 
reach scientific clarity before legal solutions are considered. 
After all, the "endless pursuit of scientific knowledge can be 
dangerous in a regulatory system in which toxic chemicals 
are deemed innocent until proven guilty. 09334 
At present, both litigation and regulation appear to be 
blunt instruments to respond to EDC risks. Indeed, litiga-
tion over EDCs appears very unlikely to succeed, let alone 
effectively deter EDC manufacturers. Regulation, with all 
its flaws, is the preferable route to protect public health, 
and regulatory capabilities would be greatly enhanced if 
Congress acts to reform the major toxics statutes. 
The application of law in contexts of scientific uncertainty 
is frequently controversial, inevitably leading to claims of 
under-regulation from the left and over-regulation from the 
334. FAGIN & LAVEUE, supra note 217, at 229. 
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rtght. When the scientific community begins to research a 
new type of toxic rtsk, the legal community should avoid a 
premature response unsupported by the data, but it should 
not let scientlftc uncertainty prevent sensible steps to pro-
tect public health. 
